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INTRODUCTION
[T]he land is sacred . . . . The land is our mother . . . . Take our land away and
we die.
−Mary Brave Bird, Lakota (1993)1
[T]hat the Civil Magistrate is a competent Judge of Religious truth . . . . is an
arrogant pretension falsified by the contradictory opinions of Rulers in all
ages . . . .
−James Madison (1785)2

The Islamic Center of Culpeper stands at 16040 Brandy Road,
nearly a two-mile drive from the heart of the small Virginia town’s
downtown drag.3 A number of longstanding churches sit along that
colonial stretch, and several more can be spotted along the route between the new mosque4 and Main Street. The Islamic house of worship formally opened its doors in early 2020 and instantly claimed its
historic status as Culpeper County’s first-ever mosque.5 The growing
Muslim population, which formerly met inside of an unheated

1. MARY BRAVE BIRD WITH RICHARD ERDOES, OHITIKA WOMAN 220 (1993).
2. 2 JAMES MADISON, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments,
in THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 187 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901).
3. ISLAMIC CTR. CULPEPER, https://islamiccenterofculpeper.org [https://perma
.cc/69E9-9XVT].
4. A mosque is an Islamic house of worship; it is also commonly referred to as a
“masjid” (Arabic). Mosque, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003).
5. Allison Brophy Champion, Islamic Center of Culpeper Looks to 2020 for Completion of County’s First Ever Mosque, CULPEPER STAR-EXPONENT (Jan. 4, 2019), https://
www.starexponent.com/news/islamic-center-of-culpeper-looks-to-for-completion
-of-county/article_2bbb19ba-3d15-5700-8ef5-9ee7b2f129e9.html [https://perma
.cc/U9HV-EHL9].
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building next to a used car dealership for their daily prayers,6 finally
had a real mosque in their adopted hometown.
Farmersville is a predominantly white and Christian town in the
heart of northeastern Texas.7 The swelling Muslim population in
nearby Dallas has recently spilled into the rural town, home to a Muslim cemetery that will accommodate the burial of 11,000 departed fathers and mothers, daughters and sons.8 This new cemetery will afford Muslims living in Farmersville, and towns in its orbit, the
opportunity to bury loved ones in line with their religious rites. A Muslim cemetery had never been established in Collin County,9 making the
Farmersville burial site a pioneer.
On a cool autumn Michigan morning, Muslim elementary school
students race out of their yellow school bus and toward their future
school. Their teachers, many of them adorned in hijab,10 stand at the
entry of the impressive new building in Pittsfield Township, a middleclass town bordering Ann Arbor, the site of the Michigan Islamic Academy’s old facility. The state-of-the-art facility inspires wide eyes on
their faces and even wider smiles from their teachers,11 foreshadowing infinite learning possibilities for the children rushing through the
doors and future generations of students who will follow in their footsteps.
***

6. Victoria St. Martin & Rachel Weiner, Muslim Group Reaches Agreement To
Build Culpeper Mosque, WASH. POST (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/local/muslim-group-reaches-agreement-to-build-culpeper-mosque/2017/04/
21/d4ccd262-2543-11e7-a1b3-faff0034e2de_story.html [https://perma.cc/P5EG
-4YYF].
7. The population of Farmersville is nearly 3,500 and is approximately seventythree percent white. See ACS Demographic and Housing Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://data.census.gov/cedsci [https://perma.cc/A8AD-FRHZ] (search in search bar
for “Farmersville, Texas”; then select “ACS Demographic and Housing Estimates”).
8. Nanette Light, About-Face in Farmersville Paves Way for Muslim Cemetery that
Had Worried Some, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Sept. 21, 2018, 4:56 PM), https://www
.dallasnews.com/news/2018/09/21/about-face-in-farmersville-paves-way-for
-muslim-cemetery-that-had-worried-some [https://perma.cc/88CJ-UWHU].
9. Wendy Hundley, Plans for Muslim Cemetery Stir Apprehension Among Farmersville Residents, DALL. MORNING NEWS (July 16, 2015, 10:53 PM), https://www
.dallasnews.com/news/2015/07/17/plans-for-muslim-cemetery-stir-apprehension
-among-farmersville-residents [https://perma.cc/T34W-NFY4].
10. The headscarf or head-wrap worn by Muslim women is called the “hijab” in
Arabic. Hijab, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY, supra note 4.
11. Construction of the new facility continued after the Michigan Islamic Academy settled its land use dispute with Pittsfield Township, Michigan, in September
2016. See infra Part III.C.
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These three Muslim institutions, located in distant and distinct
parts of the country, share one vital bond: they would likely not be
standing and serving the surrounding Muslim populations without the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).12
In September 2000, Congress enacted RLUIPA to counter Employment Division v. Smith’s retrenchment of religious protection in two
areas—the spiritual lives of prisoners and the focus of this Article,
land use.13 The federal statute empowers the Department of Justice
(DOJ) to challenge “local governments”14 that voted to bury these
Muslim institutions during the land use review process. But through
investigations and federal litigation, settlements and court orders,
RLUIPA helped lift them into existence.
Since September 2010, a decade after Congress enacted RLUIPA,
religious discrimination against Muslim land use petitions has skyrocketed.15 The discrimination experienced by Muslims within the
land use context surpasses that faced by other minority faith groups16
and severely diminishes their scope of religious exercise during a moment of enhanced vulnerability.17 This uptick in land use discrimination against Muslims is fueled by a protracted War on Terror and

12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc–5 (2018).
13. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In Smith, which involved a Native American petitioner
seeking a religious exemption from an Oregon state law that restricted ingestion of
peyote, the Supreme Court applied a rational basis review to the facially neutral Oregon state policy. Id. at 872. Thus, the Smith decision established the rule that neutral
laws of general applicability that burden religious exercise are to be reviewed using
rational basis. Id. at 879. The Supreme Court, three years later, held that government
regulations cannot “impose special disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious status.” Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
534–36 (1993). Justice Kennedy wrote that the law, which was facially neutral, was
“gerrymandered with care” to apply exclusively to the Santeria Church’s ritual killing
of animals. Id. at 542.
14. This Article will periodically refer to municipal boards and planning commissions, the two civic bodies independently or jointly tasked with making land use determinations, as “local governments.”
15. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., UPDATE ON THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S ENFORCEMENT OF
THE RELIGIOUS LAND USE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT: 2010–2016, at 4–6 (2016)
[hereinafter 2016 DOJ RLUIPA REPORT], https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/877931/
download [https://perma.cc/WNM4-GGFM].
16. Id. at 3–6.
17. The First Amendment religious clauses state that “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
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polarizing culture wars, the latter of which orients Islam as inimical to
constitutional values and ominous to America’s core identity.18
The Anti-Sharia Movement (ASM), a political campaign that
emerged in 2010 and continues today, presents the most virulent antiMuslim strand of these culture wars.19 It rages ahead while Islam
ranks as the fastest growing faith group in the United States,20 and it
spreads into new parts of the country where upstart communities are
seeking to establish mosques, Muslim cemeteries, and Islamic schools
to accommodate growing Muslim-American populations. During its
protracted and ongoing tenure, the ASM casts a heavy shadow over
these land use aspirations—in the form of mobilizing local governments to enforce its anti-Muslim mandate by denying the permits necessary to build these religious institutions.21
Land use discrimination is an under-examined front of this culture war. While law scholars have investigated land use discrimination against Muslims and the ASM as isolated phenomena,22 close
18. See WAJAHAT ALI, ELI CLIFTON, MATTHEW DUSS, LEE FANG, SCOTT KEYES & FAIZ
SHAKIR, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, FEAR, INC.: THE ROOTS OF THE ISLAMOPHOBIA NETWORK IN
AMERICA (2011), for a comprehensive examination of the private and public actors that
propagate anti-Muslim sentiment in the United States, which labels Islam as pointedly
un-American and Muslims unworthy of religious liberty. For a broader discussion of
religious liberty and the culture wars that currently grip the United States, whereby
conservative religious leadership relies on religious liberty to discriminate against
same-sex couples, members of the LGBTQ community, and proponents of abortion, see
Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 839.
19. “Muslim American,” for purposes of this Article, is not limited to American
citizens that adhere to Islam. Rather, it is defined capaciously, inclusive of all Muslims
residing within the country regardless of legal status. Echoing Abdullahi Ahmed AnNa’im, “There is simply no coherent way of regarding all American Muslims as a single
monolithic community, or of speaking about them as such,” ABDULLAHI AHMED ANNA’IM, WHAT IS AN AMERICAN MUSLIM?: EMBRACING FAITH AND CITIZENSHIP 3 (2014), and
this Article does not limit inclusion along lines of race, sect, or citizenship but rests
predominantly on self-identification.
20. The Pew Research Center projects that the Muslim population in the United
States will be the country’s second largest faith group in 2040, growing from 3.45 million to 8.1 million by 2050. Besheer Mohamed, New Estimates Show U.S. Muslim Population Continues To Grow, PEW RSCH. CTR.: FACT TANK (Jan. 3, 2018), https://www
.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/01/03/new-estimates-show-u-s-muslim
-population-continues-to-grow [https://perma.cc/VBZ7-T484].
21. See infra Part II.
22. See Eric Treene, RLUIPA and Mosques: Enforcing a Fundamental Right in Challenging Times, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 330 (2012), for an analysis of RLUIPA’s overriding of discriminatory land use denials of mosques during its first decade, written by
DOJ Special Counsel for Religious Discrimination. See Yaser Ali, Shariah and Citizenship: How Islamophobia Is Creating a Second-Class Citizenry in America, 100 CALIF. L.
REV. 1027 (2012), for an early analysis of the Anti-Sharia Movement and its erosion of
Muslims’ religious freedom in states where it was enacted.
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analysis of case law highlights their intimate interplay and compounded impact on the religious freedom of Muslim communities in
rural towns, metropolitan areas, and places beyond and in between.
This Article investigates this interplay, which explains the explosive
rise in land use discrimination against Muslim applicants from 2010
until the present.
Since 2010, the year marking the birth of the ASM and the uptick
in anti-Muslim land use discrimination it spawned, RLUIPA has served
as both a buffer and a bridge for Muslim land use applicants. First, it
empowers the DOJ to investigate local governments suspected of antiMuslim discrimination.23 This investigatory power has a deterrent effect on the incidence of religious discrimination within city boards and
planning commissions, which protects Muslim communities and safeguards their religious rights and rites.24
Second, RLUIPA authorizes the DOJ to independently file causes
of action against local governments that deny “Muslim land use requests” on discriminatory grounds.25 This power, particularly during
a span when local governments refuse to independently settle Muslim
land disputes at an eighty percent clip,26 makes RLUIPA’s productive
impact just as vital as its protective effect.27 DOJ intervention delivered land use permits to Muslim parties that local governments were
keen on denying and thus provided a federal bridge toward building
Muslim institutions that would have otherwise been preempted by
municipal boards and planning commissions. This Article, and the
case law it examines, is chiefly concerned with RLUIPA’s bridge-building power.
Land is sacred. Its intimate connection to religious expression is
exhibited by the rich indigenous traditions that first occupied this
soil.28 And today, that connection is exhibited by the milieu of faith
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–2(f).
24. See 2016 DOJ RLUIPA REPORT, supra note 15, at 3, for a description of this investigatory power.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–2(f). This Article will refer to petitions or applications
brought by Muslim parties to establish religious institutions as “Muslim land use requests.” “Religious institutions” are institutions that have a pointedly spiritual objective or mandate or are invested in the advancement of a spiritual tradition through
worship, education, or practice.
26. 2016 DOJ RLUIPA REPORT, supra note 15, at 6.
27. By “productive,” the Article refers to RLUIPA’s effect of bringing religious institutions into existence.
28. “Native American faith is inextricably bound to the use of land. The site-specific nature of Indian religious practice derives from the Native American perception
that land is itself a sacred, living being.” Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n,
485 U.S. 439, 460–61 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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groups that make up the diverse American religious tapestry. Land is
notably sacred for a religious population that is interlocked between
federal terror suspicion and local hostility while seeking to construct
religious spaces that simultaneously serve as safe havens from suspicion and centers of spiritual life. The ASM, the political movement that
castigates Islam and casts its religious institutions as ominous symbols of Sharia takeover, is the very entity that emboldens local governments to form “covenants” that drive denials of Muslim land use requests.29
Through close investigation of case law, this Article analyzes the
forceful impact anti-Sharia bills have on the determinations of local
governments presiding over Muslim land use requests. It advances the
following three entwined arguments:
First, that the discriminatory posture of municipal governments
toward Muslim land use requests is shaped by the local impact of the
ASM;
Second, that RLUIPA enforcement has not only served as an effective tool to override discriminatory denials of Muslim land use requests but restores collective and collateral rights to Muslim communities by facilitating the creation of institutions vital for religious
expression; and
Third, that RLUIPA relief curtails the municipal entanglement of
the ASM by imposing penalties on local governments, deterring prospective discrimination against Muslims within the land use realm
and beyond.
In addition to its focus on land use discrimination faced by Muslims, this Article seeks to inspire closer scrutiny of the rising incidence
of land use discrimination faced by members of minority faith groups,
such as Black churches and Jewish synagogues.30 These communities
are similarly situated to Muslims and vulnerable to rising fronts of racism and anti-Semitism that drive the land use determinations of local
governments across the country.
In addition to probing the “dialectic” between bigotry and land
use discrimination,31 this Article seeks to offer prescriptive

29. This Article adopts the lay definition of “covenant,” meaning “agreement.”
Part II.B.2 examines the distinct forms of public covenants that drive land use discrimination against Muslims.
30. 2016 DOJ RLUIPA REPORT, supra note 15, at 3–4.
31. The Author has referred to this interplay between law and actors within society, both public and private, as “dialectical Islamophobia,” a process whereby discriminatory law endorses and emboldens enforcement of discriminatory action. Khaled A.
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recommendations—namely, interventions that explore RLUIPA’s capacity to curb religious discrimination and restore religious rights
within and beyond the land use realm.
Currently, the bulk of legal scholarship examining religious freedom statutes is largely divided along distinct anti-discrimination interests. Advocates of this legislation cite their capacity to protect religious freedom during an era of diminished judicial protection,32 while
critics cite how religious freedom statutes have been wielded to justify
discrimination against sexual minorities.33 Both sides of this debate
are correct, and this Article explores the under-examined space in between and seeks to fuse the discourses by offering prescriptions that
benefit the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ)
population and religious minorities. In addition to highlighting how
members of religious minority groups, including Muslims, also identify as LGBTQ,34 this Article fixates on the entrenchment of “politico-

Beydoun, Islamophobia: Toward a Legal Definition and Framework, 116 COLUM. L. REV.
ONLINE 108, 119–20 (2016).
32. See, e.g., Qasim Rashid, The Right To Enforce: Why RLUIPA’s Land Use Provision
Is a Constitutional Federal Enforcement Power, 16 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 267 (2013). But
see Ronald Brownstein, The Supreme Court Is Colliding with a Less-Religious America,
ATLANTIC (Dec. 3, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2020/12/
how-supreme-court-champions-religious-liberty/617284 [https://perma.cc/NVT8
-QNBU] (“Ira Lupu, a George Washington University Law School professor who studies
religion and the law, notes that the Supreme Court has . . . ‘taken in the last five, six,
seven years many, many religious-liberty cases. . . . I’ve been teaching about this stuff
and writing it about for the past 35 years. I have never seen such a spurt of religiousliberty cases in such a short time, especially where over and over again there is a victory for religious-liberty claims.’”).
33. See, e.g., HUM. RTS. WATCH, “ALL WE WANT IS EQUALITY”: RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS
AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST LGBT PEOPLE IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (2018) (“The religious exemptions that have been considered or enacted by state legislatures take different forms. Some are comprehensive, providing blanket protection for entities that
do not wish to provide various services to LGBT people because of their religious or
moral beliefs. Others are more narrowly circumscribed, focusing particularly on adoption and foster care services and physical and mental healthcare services.”).
34. As coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw, Muslim and LGBTQ identities “intersect,” in
turn, exposing LGBTQ Muslims to a myriad of stigmas that arise from broader society
and those internal to the religious and social communities to which they belong. See
generally Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics,
and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991). “Perhaps no struggle is more imposing tha[n] that faced by LGBTQ Muslim-Americans. LGBTQ Muslim
Americans are stigmatized from without and, more acutely, from within their spiritual
communities.” Khaled A. Beydoun, What If Jason Collins Was a Muslim?, HUFFPOST (May
10, 2013, 4:56 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/jason-collins-muslim_b_
3255205 [https://perma.cc/F8LQ-ZYMX].
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religious” animus within local government as the primary driver of
discrimination unleashed against religious and sexual minorities.35
This Article will proceed in four parts. Part I analyzes the statutory protections and proactive measures enabled by RLUIPA.36 This
analysis is followed by an overview of the land use discrimination experienced by Muslims from 2010 until the present, the very stretch
that witnessed the emergence of the ASM.37
Part II examines the rise of the ASM as a political movement in
2010 and its impact on state legislatures and local governments
across the country.38 It then proceeds to examine the ASM’s pronounced impact in conservative states and rural areas and how its
varying legal and discursive resonance impacts city boards and planning commissions presiding over Muslim land use requests.39
Part III investigates the ASM’s projective impact on municipal
governments through court cases involving Muslim land use disputes.40 These RLUIPA cases illustrate how the ASM takes local form
through the discriminatory behaviors of city boards and planning
commissions in distinct parts of the country—presiding over land use
applications for mosques in Virginia and Tennessee,41 Muslim cemeteries in Texas and Minnesota,42 and an Islamic school in Michigan.43
Part IV identifies RLUIPA’s effects of restoring religious rights
and curtailing the influence of the ASM within municipal state bodies.44 It leads with analyzing how the creation of RLUIPA-enabled Muslim institutions activates and expands collective free exercise and collateral rights for Muslim populations.45 It then examines how RLUIPA
relief erodes the municipal entanglement of the ASM by exposing local
35. This Article refers to organizations, and broader political fronts, that infuse
conservative religious values into state policy as “politico-religious” groups or movements. The ASM qualifies as a politico-religious movement, while the Family Research
Center—a leading anti-LGBTQ group that champions “family values” to further homophobic policy goals—is a politico-religious group. For more on the Family Research
Council’s anti-LGBTQ stance, see Family Research Council, S. POVERTY L. CTR., https://
www.splcenter.org/fighting-hate/extremist-files/group/family-research-council
[https://perma.cc/N9UQ-QBKF].
36. See infra Part I.A.
37. See infra Part I.B.
38. See infra Part II.A.
39. See infra Part II.B.
40. See infra Part III.
41. See infra Part III.A.
42. See infra Part III.B.
43. See infra Part III.C.
44. See infra Part IV.
45. See infra Part IV.A.
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governments to prospective establishment clause challenges from religious and sexual minority groups.46
I. RELIGION, LAW, AND LAND USE
Employment Division v. Smith marked a decline in the arc of free
exercise of religion protection by the courts.47 The Supreme Court’s
ruling extended even greater deference to state and local governments, and it overturned jurisprudence that enabled the courts to apply exacting scrutiny to state and municipal policies that substantially
burden religious exercise.48 For proponents of robust judicial protection of religious freedom, Smith narrowed the Warren Court’s capacious framing of religious discrimination49 and enabled municipal
governments to discriminate against religious groups behind the veil
of administrative deference.50 In the immediate wake of the Supreme
Court decision, constitutional law scholar Michael McConnell indicted
Smith as “contrary to the deep logic of the First Amendment.”51
In the years that followed, Congress enacted legislation that
sought to balance the effect of Smith in favor of restoring religious protection. First, it ratified the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)
in 1993, which for four years reestablished strict scrutiny review of
neutral and generally applicable state policies that substantially

46. See infra Part IV.B.
47. See 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
48. Smith overturned Sherbert v. Verner, which set forth the rule that strict scrutiny review be applied to neutral state regulations that substantially burden free exercise. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972) (holding the religious freedom of Amish parents trumped the state’s interest in
mandating education beyond the eighth grade, in turn creating a religious exemption
from Wisconsin’s generally applicable compulsory education law).
49. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404 (“For ‘[i]f the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously between
religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown,
366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961))).
50. See infra Part III.
51. Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1111 (1990).
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burden religion.52 Seven years later, Congress enacted RLUIPA,53 legislation that revived Sherbert v. Verner’s strict scrutiny test to examine
state and municipal regulations that substantially burden the religious exercise of incarcerated persons and land use applicants.54
RLUIPA came into being one year before 9/11 and its turbulent
aftermath, a period when federal national security and counterterror
policy exposed Muslims to an unprecedented degree of state scrutiny
and popular backlash.55 This backlash marked their mosques and
cemeteries, schools, and secular institutions as bastions of suspected
terror activity.56
A. RELIGIOUS LAND USE & INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT
This Section examines the statutory protection and proactive
measures RLUIPA extends against religious discrimination within the
land use realm. First, it analyzes protections against land use regulations that substantially burden religious exercise or intentionally discriminate against or exclude individual religions from access to land.57
52. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141,
107 Stat. 1488, invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The Supreme Court, in City of Boerne v. Flores, found that Congress exceeded its Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement authority with regard to its application of RFRA to state and
local governments. 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). RFRA still applies to federal government
action, but not the states. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb; see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores,
Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 736 (2014) (holding that the religious rights of closely held corporations are to be exempted from a federal contraception mandate).
53. Note, Religious Land Use in the Federal Courts Under RLUIPA, 120 HARV. L. REV.
2178, 2181 (2007) (“Congress was determined to revive the compelling interest test
in any arena in which the Court would permit it to do so. Seizing on the Smith dictum
suggesting a loophole for ‘individualized governmental assessment[s],’ Congress in
2000 enacted RLUIPA to require the application of Sherbert in two areas in which such
assessments were common: land use decisions and regulations governing the conduct
of institutionalized persons.” (alteration in original) (citing Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872, 884 (1990))).
54. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
55. See generally Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson, Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration Law After September 11, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims, 58 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 295 (2002), for a comprehensive analysis of the disproportionately
discriminatory effect the executive and legislative policies enacted after 9/11 had on
Muslim populations within the United States.
56. Id.
57. RLUIPA defines “land use regulation” capaciously:
[A] zoning or landmarking law, or the application of such a law, that limits or
restricts a claimant’s use or development of land (including a structure affixed to land), if the claimant has an ownership, leasehold, easement, servitude, or other property interest in the regulated land or a contract or option
to acquire such an interest.
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Second, it presents the causes of action that can be initiated by a private actor or by the DOJ independently. The latter enforcement mechanism makes RLUIPA an especially potent tool for countering antiMuslim discrimination within the land use context.
1. Protection
Local governments, through boards and planning commissions,
are extended considerable deference with regard to land use administration.58 Determinations are made squarely at the municipal level,59
beyond the reach of state and federal government. These decisions,
and those commissioned to make them, are naturally influenced by
the political and cultural stimuli that surround them. This influence
includes religious and political movements that deeply impact municipal administration and have sway over members of the polity that sit
on city boards and planning commissions. Together, the broad administrative latitude granted to local governments,60 combined with their
susceptibility to local forms of bigotry, has resulted in the rising incidence of land use discrimination against faith groups seeking to establish religious institutions such as parochial schools and synagogues,
Hindu temples, and mosques.61 In short, the broad municipal deference extended by Smith enabled local governments to enmesh themselves more intimately with religion and religious discrimination—or
for purposes of this Article, anti-Muslim animus.62

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–5(5). This Article focuses on the discriminatory enforcement of zoning laws by local governments against Muslim claimants who own or hold acquired
interest in the property.
58. See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 389 (1926) (holding that
a municipal government, like Euclid, Ohio, holds “authority to govern itself as it sees fit
within the limits of the organic law of its creation and the State and Federal Constitutions”).
59. Land use determinations, however, must abide by zoning guidelines crafted
at the state level. Id.
60. “In accepting the municipality’s appeal in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
the Court did much more than sanction the pecuniary loss suffered by Ambler Realty;
it endorsed a new form of urban planning that would revolutionize the American landscape. Modern residential zoning was constitutionally born.” Nadav Shoked, The Reinvention of Ownership: The Embrace of Residential Zoning and the Modern Populist Reading of Property, 28 YALE J. ON REGUL. 91, 95 (2011).
61. 2016 DOJ RLUIPA REPORT, supra note 15, at 3–7.
62. This Article will use “anti-Muslim animus” interchangeably with “Islamophobia.”
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Congress identified land use discrimination faced by religious
groups as a primary motive for RLUIPA enforcement.63 This recognition of the comparative vulnerability of religious groups brought forth
the restoration of a more exacting review of land use regulations.64
This vulnerability, DOJ statistics reveal, is even greater for minority
faith groups filing land use requests to build houses of worship,
schools, and cemeteries throughout the United States.65
RLUIPA’s statutory foundation is the restoration of a strict scrutiny review of land use regulations that substantially burden religious
exercise.66 This general rule negates Smith within the area of land
use67:
No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a
manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution, unless the government
demonstrates that the imposition of the burden on that person, assembly, or
institution—
(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government
interest.68

63. “The [legislative] hearing record compiled massive evidence that [the right to
religious land use] is frequently violated.” 146 CONG. REC. S7774 (daily ed. July 27,
2000) (joint statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch and Sen. Edward M. Kennedy). For an
analysis of the legislative history behind RLUIPA, see Marci A. Hamilton, Federalism
and the Public Good: The True Story Behind the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act, 78 IND. L.J. 311, 342–52 (2003).
64. The increased scrutiny, though, has not been universally celebrated.
RLUIPA remains the subject of much debate within the academy—both on its
merits and because of the belief that it is an unwarranted interference with
an area set aside for local decisionmaking. RLUIPA has become even more
controversial with the public at large in the wake of increased demands for
religious accommodations.
Michael C. Pollack, Land Use Federalism’s False Choice, 68 ALA. L. REV. 707, 710 (2017).
Pollack cites Marci A. Hamilton, among other law scholars, who deems RLUIPA a violation of municipal sovereignty and, more emphatically, “the most reckless federal intervention in local land use law and community decision-making in history.” Id. (quoting Marci A. Hamilton, The Constitutional Limitations on Congress’s Power over Local
Land Use: Why the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act Is Unconstitutional, 2 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 366, 369 (2009)).
65. 2016 DOJ RLUIPA REPORT, supra note 15, at 3–7.
66. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1).
67. RLUIPA addresses the Smith ruling, stating that a “substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance, even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability.” Id. § 2000cc(a)(2)(A).
68. Id. § 2000cc(a)(1).
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Thus, in order to survive a RLUIPA suit against action that substantially burdens religious exercise,69 a local government must satisfy the two-part strict scrutiny test. Conversely, the Smith standard
would only apply a rational basis review to facially neutral and generally applicable regulatory action,70 and it shifts the heavy burden onto
petitioners to prove intentional discrimination.71
Per its title, “substantial burden” keys in on the impact of a stated
regulation instead of its facial appearance—and specifically, the discriminatory effect land use regulations have on diminishing religious
exercise.72 Consequently, RLUIPA limits the broad deference Smith extends to local governments within the land use context by flagging policy that disproportionately impacts members of a specific faith group,
and it extends power to the DOJ and aggrieved parties to challenge
these local determinations in federal court.73 This federalizes local
69. See id. § 2000cc–2. The statute does not provide further clarity as to the specific meaning of “substantial burden.” A number of federal court decisions involving
RLUIPA claims have attempted to define “substantial burden” more narrowly. For example, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Midrash Sephardi v. Town of Surfside, a
case involving a Sephardic Jewish community seeking to establish a synagogue in Surfside, Florida, stated that state action that “directly coerces the religious adherent to
conform his or her behavior accordingly” rises to the level of a substantial burden. 366
F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004). Two years later, the Ninth Circuit offered, “[F]or a
land use regulation to impose a ‘substantial burden,’ it must be ‘oppressive’ to a ‘significantly great’ extent. That is, a ‘substantial burden’ on ‘religious exercise’ must impose a significantly great restriction or onus upon such exercise.” Guru Nanak Sikh
Soc’y v. Cnty. of Sutter, 456 F.3d 978, 988 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing San Jose Christian Coll.
v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004)) (discussing a RLUIPA claim
involving the land use denial of a Sikh community’s land use petition to build a Sikh
temple in Yuba City, California).
70. The Smith Court explained:
We conclude today that the sounder approach, and the approach in accord
with the vast majority of our precedents, is to hold the [Sherbert strict scrutiny] test inapplicable to such challenges. The government’s ability to enforce
generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct, like its ability
to carry out other aspects of public policy, “cannot depend on measuring the
effects of a governmental action on a religious objector’s spiritual development.”
Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (citing Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988)).
71. See id.
72. “[T]he substantial burden is imposed in the implementation of a land use regulation or system of . . . regulations, under which a government makes, or has in place
formal or informal procedures or practices that permit the government to make, individualized assessments of the proposed uses of the property involved.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc(a)(2)(C).
73. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals observed that RLUIPA’s substantial burden protection “backstops the explicit prohibition of religious discrimination in the

2021]

ON SACRED LAND

1817

disputes,74 removing them from state venues that may share the same
religious animus manifested by the municipal bodies that denied their
land use request.
In 2015, the Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Alito,
affirmed RLUIPA’s broad application in Holt v. Hobbs, holding that governments have no responsibility to issue free exercise exemptions.75
This form of proactive accommodation is beyond the scope of RLUIPA,
Holt affirmed.76 However, a state body responding to a RLUIPA challenge must “at a minimum, offer persuasive reasons why it believes
that it” should deny a party’s free exercise rights.77 Critics may argue
that Justice Alito’s assessment of RLUIPA is exclusive to the prison
context, where security and state concerns differ from the land use
context.78 However, Justice Alito did not explicitly limit this reading of
RLUIPA to prisons,79 and therefore, the Court places an equal burden
on state actors within the prison and land use contexts to offer compelling justifications for denying free exercise requests.80
In addition to restricting land use regulations that substantially
burden religious exercise, RLUIPA also bars explicit discrimination
and exclusion.81 As examined closely in actual RLUIPA cases and disputes, explicit municipal discrimination against Muslim land use
later section of the Act, much as the disparate-impact theory of employment discrimination backstops the prohibition of intentional discrimination [in the workplace].” Sts.
Constantine & Helen Greek Orthodox Church, Inc. v. City of New Berlin, 396 F.3d 895,
900 (7th Cir. 2005).
74. Law scholar Marci Hamilton, who criticizes RLUIPA from a Framers’ intent
perspective, argues, “[W]e are in the era when the federal government is exercising its
power to unilaterally rearrange the cities’ land use plans.” Marci A. Hamilton, The ReMaking of America’s Cities by Religious Organizations and the Department of Justice, JUSTIA: VERDICT (Sept. 1, 2016), https://verdict.justia.com/2016/09/01/re-making
-americas-cities-religious-organizations-department-justice [https://perma.cc/
BWY5-K7FX].
75. 574 U.S. 352, 369 (2015). The case involved a Muslim prisoner denied the
ability to grow a half-inch beard in line with his religious customs within an Arkansas
federal prison, which the court overruled on RLUIPA substantial burden grounds. For
an analysis of where Hobbs fits within the broader legal history of free exercise of religion accommodations spearheaded by Muslim claimants within prison, see Khaled A.
Beydoun, Islam Incarcerated: Religious Accommodation of Muslim Prisoners Before Holt
v. Hobbs, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 99 (2016).
76. Holt, 574 U.S. at 369.
77. Id.
78. For a discussion of the distinct set of state interests that are cited in response
to RLUIPA religious accommodation claims within the prison context, see James D. Nelson, Incarceration, Accommodation, and Strict Scrutiny, 95 VA. L. REV. 2053 (2009).
79. Holt, 574 U.S. at 369.
80. See id.
81. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1)–(3).
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petitions is most apparent in states where the ASM is especially resonant.82 But it is less conspicuous in regions of the country where the
ASM’s impact spurs latent or subtle animus, which makes the “substantial burden” RLUIPA claim vital for Muslim claimants in these locales.83 Part III of this Article, through examination of case law, analyzes the varying “projective effect” of anti-Sharia bills across
geographic and political lines.84
In sum, RLUIPA extends two distinct claims for prospective relief
against religious discrimination within the land use realm. If a claimant cannot satisfy the more demanding burden of proving explicit discrimination or exclusion,85 municipal action that substantially burdens religious exercise is an alternate and less demanding pathway
toward relief.86 This latter substantive intervention is RLUIPA’s most
forceful rebuttal to Smith, and it is the statutory springboard for
causes of action that lay the legal groundwork for establishing the
Muslim institutions staunchly opposed by municipal boards and planning commissions.
2. Causes of Action
RLUIPA’s protective measures enable causes of action against
land use regulations that explicitly discriminate on religious grounds
and regulations that substantially burden religious exercise. By negating Smith within the land use realm, RLUIPA expands religious protection in the area of land use on the substantive front through its facilitation of more robust enforcement on the proactive front.87
RLUIPA enables the DOJ or an aggrieved party to bring forward a
claim of land use discrimination against a local government in federal

82. See infra Part III.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). RLUIPA defines a claimant as “a person raising a
claim or defense under this chapter.” Id. § 2000cc–5(1).
84. See infra Part III. The Author adopts Lauren Sudeall Lucas’s “protective-projective framework” delineating judicial framing of religious identity expression. Lauren Sudeall Lucas, The Free Exercise of Religious Identity, 64 UCLA L. REV. 54, 95 (2017).
This Article broadens Sudeall Lucas’s definition of “projective religious identity” to include the ASM’s politicization of religion that imposes castigatory views of Islam onto
local governments vis-à-vis state legislation. This politicization pressures city boards
and state planning commissions to deny Muslim land use petitions. See id. at 96–106.
Contrary to projective claims, “[p]rotective claims are those that aim to preserve individuals’ or groups’ ability to define and pursue their religious identity within the confines of their own sphere.” Id. at 89.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(b)(1)–(3).
86. See id. § 2000cc(a)(2)(A)–(C).
87. See id. § 2000cc–2 (spelling out judicial relief under RLUIPA).
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court.88 DOJ enforcement protects aggrieved parties engaged in land
use disputes from exposure to the popular backlash that a personal
lawsuit may invite, in addition to removal from a (potentially) oppositional state court.89 For members of minority faith groups living in
locales where anti-Semitism is pronounced or xenophobia targeting
Hindu or Sikh land use applicants is acute,90 this provides protective
shelter from popular backlash and reassignment to a favorable judicial venue. Thus, causes of action advanced by the DOJ have the added
protective effect of insulating religious minority groups—including
aggrieved Muslim land use applicants confronting the backlash
spurred by the ASM—while also producing more favorable results.91
Unilateral action against a local government by the DOJ also puts
the great force of the federal government behind an aggrieved party.
As closely examined in Part III, the DOJ typically commences a factfinding investigation into land use disputes before it files suit against
a municipal board or planning commission.92 This preliminary intervention enables the DOJ to work closely with the aggrieved party, oftentimes in conjunction with a civil rights or advocacy organization.93
Led by the DOJ, these entities work in unison to negotiate a settlement
that concludes the dispute without litigation and results in delivery of

88. Id. In addition to lawsuits, RLUIPA empowers the DOJ to initiate investigations
against local governments suspected of religious discrimination and the submission of
amicus briefs supporting RLUIPA suits brought forward by aggrieved parties. 2016
DOJ RLUIPA REPORT, supra note 15, at 4.
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–2(a). “A person may assert a violation of this chapter
as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a
government.” Id.
90. See cases cited supra note 69.
91. 2016 DOJ RLUIPA REPORT, supra note 15 (depicting an increase in Muslim DOJ
RLUIPA investigations following 2010).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–2(f).
The United States may bring an action for injunctive or declaratory relief to
enforce compliance with this chapter. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to deny, impair, or otherwise affect any right or authority of the Attorney General, the United States, or any agency, officer, or employee of the
United States, acting under any law other than this subsection, to institute or
intervene in any proceeding.
Id.
93. See, e.g., CAIR Civil Rights, CAIR, https://www.cair.com/civil_rights/cair-civil
-rights [https://perma.cc/6HS3-J89P] (describing the work of the Council on American-Islamic Relations, a prominent civil rights organization that serves clients who
have been victims of discrimination).
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the desired land use permit from the local governing body.94 If a settlement cannot be reached, the DOJ will seek a federal court order to
deliver the needed permit to enable the construction or use of the religious institution.95
As examined in the forthcoming Section, DOJ intervention in land
use disputes involving Muslim parties has been vital to collective religious exercise, particularly from 2010 until the present.96 This
timespan converges with a moment when the Muslim population is
growing in number and spreading into new regions of the country.97
As examined in Part III, DOJ intervention is especially instrumental in
areas of the country with small and new Muslim communities, which
are confronting the civic opposition incited by the ASM that brands
mosques, Muslim cemeteries, and Muslim schools as ominous symbols of “Sharia takeover.”98
B. LAND USE DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MUSLIMS
This Section analyzes land use discrimination targeting Muslims
since RLUIPA’s enactment in 2000. It begins with an overview of the
turbulent terrain Muslims navigated within and beyond the land use
context after the 9/11 terror attacks, which took place one year after
RLUIPA came into effect.99 This is followed by analysis of the land use
discrimination Muslims confronted in RLUIPA’s second decade—from
2010 through the present—which escalated in line with the emergence of the ASM.100
1. The Terrain
Land use discrimination is a less examined front of mounting
state suspicion against Muslim communities. While law scholars have
thoroughly examined discrimination against Muslim expression
94. See, e.g., Rose French, Feds Investigate Islamic Center’s Rejection, STAR TRIB.
(Oct. 30, 2012, 7:41 AM), https://www.startribune.com/feds-investigate-islamic
-center-s-rejection/176348731 [https://perma.cc/T94H-DD28].
95. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–2(f).
96. See discussion infra Part I.B.
97. Mohamed, supra note 20.
98. See infra Part III. For a popular article that captured the ASM’s projection of
“creeping Sharia” threats during its political emergence, see Brian Montopoli, Fears of
Sharia Law in America Grow Among Conservatives, CBS NEWS (Oct. 13, 2010, 3:30 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/fears-of-sharia-law-in-america-grow-among
-conservatives [https://perma.cc/JTR9-7EYF].
99. See infra Part I.B.1. RLUIPA became effective policy on September 22, 2000.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc.
100. See infra Part I.B.2.
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within employment,101 law enforcement,102 and counterterrorism,103
differential treatment of Muslims within the land use context has garnered only minimal attention—particularly during the recent spike in
discrimination incited by the ASM. This scholarly void facilitates the
popular view that land use discrimination against Muslims is declining or not as intense as the previous decade.
Close assessment of land use discrimination statistics and case
law reveals that the very opposite is true.104 A year before the 9/11
terror attacks and the horrific uptick in anti-Muslim discrimination
that followed,105 RLUIPA restored expanded protection to religious
groups within the land use context.106 This enhanced protection was
especially timely for Muslims confronting mounting counterterror
suspicion from federal agents, their local law enforcement proxies,
and most violently, private hatemongers.107 This “shared rage” unleashed on Muslim communities by state policy and vigilante violence
101. See generally Sahar F. Aziz, Coercive Assimilationism: The Perils of Muslim
Women’s Identity Performance in the Workplace, 20 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (2014), for a
leading examination of employment discrimination experienced by Muslim women—
and, in response to that discrimination, strategies adopted by Muslim women to convey their racial and religious expression in ways that diminish the prospect of animus.
102. See Emmanuel Mauleón, Black Twice: Policing Black Muslim Identities, 65
UCLA L. REV. 1326 (2018) (investigating how Black Muslim populations face multiple
forms of counterterror policing on account of their combined racial and religious identity).
103. See Samuel J. Rascoff, Establishing Official Islam? The Law and Strategy of
Counter-Radicalization, 64 STAN. L. REV. 125 (2012), for an analysis of how federal
counter-radicalization surveillance programs erode the religious liberty of targeted
Muslim populations and clash with establishment clause protections. See also Amna
Akbar, Policing “Radicalization,” 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 809 (2013), for a critical assessment of how counter-radicalization policing ties the religious behaviors of Muslims to
terror suspicion.
104. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., REPORT ON THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE RELIGIOUS LAND
USE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSONS ACT (2010) [hereinafter TENTH ANNIVERSARY
RLUIPA REPORT], https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2010/12/
15/rluipa_report_092210.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BGC-CSV9]. More than thirteen percent of DOJ land use discrimination investigations involved a Muslim claimant. Id. at 6.
105. See Akram & Johnson, supra note 55. See also Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared
by Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes of Passion, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1259
(2004), for a trenchant analysis of the impact counterterror policy enacted in the wake
of the 9/11 terror attacks had on inciting vigilante violence unleashed by private actors against Muslim and perceived-Muslim individuals. Anti-Muslim hate crimes proliferated by more than 1600% in 2001, with 481 separate anti-Islamic incidents. UNIF.
CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM, FBI, HATE CRIME STATISTICS (2001), https://ucr.fbi.gov/hate
-crime/2001 [https://perma.cc/T5TV-KP69].
106. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc.
107. See Akram & Johnson, supra note 55, at 331–45 (discussing the “dragnet” by
law enforcement and the federal government of Muslim minorities post-9/11).

1822

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[105:1803

trickled into the land use realm,108 with RLUIPA responding during its
embryonic stages to protect Muslim land use requests from religious
animus swelling within local governments.109 Indeed, municipal
boards and planning commissions were prone to the very same antiMuslim suspicion that gripped governmental actors on the state and
federal levels after 9/11.110
The protection of RLUIPA proved transformative for Muslim land
use applicants during 9/11’s turbulent aftermath. RLUIPA constricted
the legal shelter Smith furnished local governments to deny Muslim
land use requests behind the entangled veil of subtlety and national
security.111 It empowered the DOJ to unilaterally commence RLUIPA
investigations and causes of action on behalf of shell-shocked Muslim
communities.112 RLUIPA emerged at a time when Muslims seeking to
establish mosques, cemeteries, schools, and secular institutions found
themselves interlocked between local governments and constituents
beholden to sharp anti-Muslim attitudes.113 In turn, it extended protective measures and proactive mechanisms against a hateful front
that an unchecked Smith regime would have emboldened within the
land use realm and adjacent terrains of Muslim American life.114
2. The Present
Discrimination against Muslim land use requests has risen markedly since the post-9/11 period.115 In a study published in 2016, the
DOJ found that the percentage of RLUIPA investigations involving
mosques or Islamic schools rose “from 15% in the 2000 to August
2010 period to 38% during the period from September 2010 to the
present.”116 Again, the ASM’s emergence in 2010 and its mandate of
banning Sharia law mainstreamed a form of threat intimately

108. See generally Ahmad, supra note 105.
109. TENTH ANNIVERSARY RLUIPA REPORT, supra note 104, at 5–6.
110. See id.
111. See supra notes 67–74 and accompanying text.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–2(f).
113. See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 53–55 and accompanying text. One commentator observed,
“RLUIPA did not attempt simply to reverse Smith, as RFRA did; rather, it defined ‘religious exercise’ to include the use of a plot of land for religious purposes, and it added
‘equal terms’ and anti-exclusion causes of action.” Note, supra note 53, at 2196.
115. “[T]he sharp increase in total RLUIPA cases involving mosques and Islamic
schools is a matter for concern and attention, even when those cases do not involve
explicit anti-Muslim animus.” 2016 DOJ RLUIPA REPORT, supra note 15, at 6.
116. Id. at 4 (citing TENTH ANNIVERSARY RLUIPA REPORT, supra note 104).

2021]

ON SACRED LAND

1823

connected to land,117 reflected by an over 150% increase in DOJ
RLUIPA investigations from the previous decade.118
As a result, Muslim parties seeking to establish mosques, cemeteries, and schools in locales where state legislatures introduced or
enacted anti-Sharia bills were confronted with zealous opposition
from local governments and their constituents.119 Thus, the emergence and immediate appeal of the ASM, combined with the pointedly
anti-Muslim posture of the Trump administration,120 elucidate why
land use discrimination against Muslims more than doubled from
2010 through the present, compared to the previous decade.
38%

40%
30%
20%

15%

10%
0%
2000-8/2010

9/2010-Present

% All RLUIPA Investigations

Figure 1 | DOJ RLUIPA Investigations Involving Muslim Claimants121

117. See infra Part III.
118. See 2016 DOJ RLUIPA REPORT, supra note 15, at 4 (noting that investigations
increased from 15% between 2000 and 2010 to 38% between 2010 and 2016). Although its legal mandate focused on banning the citation of Sharia law by state courts,
it capitalized on state legislative channels as a vehicle for a far broader objective. This
is closely examined in Part II of this Article.
119. See supra notes 104–11 and accompanying text.
120. For a chronological log of President Trump’s anti-Muslim pronouncements,
see Jenna Johnson & Abigail Hauslohner, ‘I Think Islam Hates Us’: A Timeline of Trump’s
Comments About Islam and Muslims, WASH. POST (May 20, 2017, 2:16 PM), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/05/20/i-think-islam-hates
-us-a-timeline-of-trumps-comments-about-islam-and-muslims [https://perma.cc/
5NVG-GRP9]. While critics of the travel ban executive order cite these statements as
indicative of his intent to discriminate against Muslims, the Supreme Court in Trump
v. Hawaii ruled otherwise. 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2408 (2018) (“The President lawfully exercised that discretion based on his finding . . . that entry of the covered aliens would be
detrimental to the national interest.”).
121. 2016 DOJ RLUIPA REPORT, supra note 15, at 4.
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Muslim land use disputes (38%) account for nearly the same percentage of DOJ RLUIPA investigations as Christian claimants (45%)
between September 2010 and July 2016.122 This figure is especially
staggering given that the Muslim population in the United States only
encompassed 3.45 million people, which was roughly one percent of
the entire population.123 On the other hand, over seventy percent of
the American population identify as Christian,124 which accounts for
roughly 233.7 million people.125 In comparison, the Mormon population is nearly double the size of the Muslim population in the United
States.126 These demographic comparisons illustrate the severity of
land use discrimination against Muslim claimants.
Comparative analysis of land use discrimination faced by other
minority faith groups sheds even greater light on the disproportionate
land use discrimination faced by Muslims in the current decade. Between September 2010 and July 2016, the DOJ found that Muslims
were nineteen times more likely than Hindus,127 almost ten times
more likely than Buddhists,128 and approximately four times more
likely than Jewish applicants to have their land use petitions denied
on account of their religious identity.129 Figure 2, below, offers a
graphic illustration of the comparative discrimination across faith
group lines.
Although land use discrimination stands as a primary concern
across minority religious lines, the DOJ observed that “[t]he increase
in Muslim cases is the most significant development.”130 This in turn
renders the DOJ’s capacity to independently enforce RLUIPA

122. Id. at 5.
123. Mohamed, supra note 20 (discussing a 2017 estimate of the Muslim population in the United States).
124. Religious Landscape Study, PEW RSCH. CTR., https://www.pewforum.org/
religious-landscape-study [https://perma.cc/FB2A-KPUM] (including a breakdown of
religious identification by state).
125. See id.; Dudley L. Poston, Jr., 3 Ways That the U.S. Population Will Change over
the Next Decade, PBS: NEWS HOUR (Jan. 2, 2020, 12:22 PM), https://www.pbs.org/
newshour/nation/3-ways-that-the-u-s-population-will-change-over-the-next-decade
[https://perma.cc/DJF7-HCWV] (estimating U.S. population to be approximately 331
million people).
126. Religious Landscape Study, supra note 124 (showing that the Mormon population makes up approximately 1.6% of the U.S. population).
127. Two percent of the land use investigations involved a Hindu petitioner. 2016
DOJ RLUIPA REPORT, supra note 15, at 5.
128. Four percent of the land use investigations involved a Buddhist petitioner. Id.
129. Eleven percent of the land use investigations involved a Jewish petitioner. Id.
130. Id. at 6.
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compliance, and deter land use discrimination, disproportionately vital for Muslims.

Figure 2 | DOJ RLUIPA Investigations by Religion (Sept. 2010–July
2016)131
In the face of higher incidence of anti-Muslim land use discrimination, RLUIPA’s impact on resolving land disputes involving Muslim
parties is also greater. The DOJ found that eighty-four percent of DOJ
investigations involving non-Muslim parties were positively resolved
without the United States or the aggrieved party filing a lawsuit
against the local municipal body.132 However, that figure drops to
twenty percent in Islamic school and mosque cases.133 This wide discrepancy illustrates a greater willingness on the part of local governments to settle land disputes with aggrieved Hindu, Christian, or Jewish parties and staunch refusal to do the same when the land use
applicant is Muslim.134 This heightened resistance to the creation of
Muslim institutions speaks to the politically potent tropes that conflate them (and Islam at large) with terrorism and the influence of the
ASM to project these castigatory views onto local governments presiding over land use applications.

131. Id. at 5 (showing data sourced from DOJ statistics).
132. Id. at 6. See Figure 3, at page 1826 of this Article, for a graphical depiction of
this statistic.
133. 2016 DOJ RLUIPA REPORT, supra note 15, at 6.
134. “While it is encouraging that so many RLUIPA cases are resolved once a local
government is informed of its obligations under RLUIPA, the sharp disparity between
Muslim and non-Muslim cases in this regard is cause for concern.” Id.
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Figure 3 | DOJ Investigations Resolved Without RLUIPA Suit135
In light of the intense discrimination against Muslims on the land
use application and resolution fronts, the DOJ’s ability to unilaterally
commence a RLUIPA cause of action against local governments is especially salient for Muslim life—not merely Muslim land use.136 By
compelling hostile local governments to extend land use permits by
way of litigation, or the threat of litigation, the DOJ is driving mosques
and community spaces, Muslim cemeteries and schools, into existence
within the very towns where local governments are invested in preventing them.
As closely examined in Part IV, this federal enforcement power
has a transformative impact on Muslim life within locales such as Culpeper, Virginia, or Farmersville, Texas,137 rural and remote towns
where no mosque or Muslim cemetery has ever been established.138
As illustrated most vividly through these examples, RLUIPA blazes
135. Id.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc–2(f).
137. Land dispute cases involving these two towns will be closely examined in Part
III of this Article. See infra Parts III.A.1, B.1.
138. See infra Part IV. The reverse can also be true. The creation of Muslim institutions in areas where they never existed may, gradually, transform the attitudes and
views of opponents to be more accepting of Muslims in their community and their faith.
Great familiarity, or “contact,” with Muslims can engender tolerance and even affinity
where opposition and Islamophobia once existed. This phenomenon of building
bridges across groups has been dubbed “contact theory” by scholars examining intergroup animus against LGBTQ communities. See Brian F. Harrison & Melissa R. Michelson, Contact Theory and the Distinct Case of LGBT People and Rights, in OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICS (Dec. 23, 2019), https://oxfordre.com/politics/view/
10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-1174
[https://perma.cc/65N6-EGXR].
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pathways for the realization of collective Muslim expression in areas
where public opposition has emaciated it.139
For fledgling Muslim communities in Virginia and Texas, or the
more mature Muslim populations that have withstood the state and
popular backlash of the previous decade,140 plans to establish religious institutions have become increasingly daunting.141 This is particularly the case when Muslim land use requests are being filed during a moment of intersecting hostility on the part of state legislators
peddling anti-Sharia bills and the hatred they project onto municipal
boards and planning commissions.142 However, as illustrated by the
statistics examined above and the case law analyzed below, RLUIPA
has extended a bridge over the discriminatory divide widened by the
ASM between mosques, Muslim cemeteries, and schools and the land
use petitioners seeking to build them.143
II. BETWEEN LAW AND RAGE
An inquiry into the anatomy of the movement driving land use
discrimination against Muslims is an essential prerequisite to understanding rising municipal opposition to mosques, Muslim cemeteries,
and Muslim schools. The ASM emerged in 2010—ten years after Congress enacted RLUIPA—and gained political and popular momentum
in the decade that followed.144 Manifesting the ASM’s impact on local
governments across the country, that very year also marked the prolific increase in land use discrimination investigations involving Muslim parties, which comprised thirty-eight percent of all RLUIPA DOJ
investigations from September 2010 to July 2016.145
The emergence of the ASM as a national movement and the rise
in land use discrimination cases involving Muslims are deeply correlated. While federal counterterror policy assigned the presumption of
terror suspicion on Muslim individuals,146 anti-Sharia bills have the
effect of marking Muslim religious institutions as the material coming
139. As a result, this enables and expands the “protective expression” of religious
identity within Muslim institutions. Sudeall Lucas, supra note 84, at 89.
140. See 2016 DOJ RLUIPA REPORT, supra note 15.
141. Id.
142. See infra Part II.
143. See Figure 4, at page 1835 of this Article, for a graphic of the number of antiSharia bills introduced in every state across the country.
144. See Ali, supra note 22 at 1064–66 (describing a proliferation of ASM legislative measures).
145. 2016 DOJ RLUIPA REPORT, supra note 15, at 4.
146. See Beydoun, supra note 31, at 111 (noting that structural policy legitimizes
more than just dislike and fear of Muslims).
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of Sharia law—a civilizational threat broader, and more ominous, than
a mere terror threat.147
A. THE ANTI-SHARIA MOVEMENT
The ASM’s discursive impact on local governments and the public
dramatically outsized its legislative achievements.148 The rift between
the two, and the absence of legal scholarship addressing the latter’s
impact on Muslim life at large, has bred misguided views that the ASM
fell short of its goals of enacting Sharia bans and is sputtering out today. Both are wrong.
Per the words of its architect, the fundamental aim of the ASM
was heuristic.149 The legislative bills introduced across the country
were intended to prompt the question, “What is Sharia?” within
households and the heart of rural and urban communities, and inside
city councils and planning commissions.150 The ASM was more of a
mass (mis)education campaign fixated on winning hearts and minds
within states where legislation was introduced than it was a political
movement seeking to enact legislation.151 Conservative politicians
peddling copycat bills served as the optimal conduits to project the
message that Islam, using state courts as its Trojan horse, was bent on
taking over the country one community at a time.152 This Section surveys the political anatomy and objectives of the ASM and its national
impact across geographic and political boundaries.

147. For example, residents of Wilson, Wisconsin, stated, “I don’t want [that
mosque] in my backyard . . . [a Muslim’s] goal is to wipe out Christianity around the
world.” Barbara Abel & Julia Lieblich, Rural Controversy: A Mosque in Sheboygan, TIME
(Aug. 19, 2010), http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2011842,00
.html [https://perma.cc/9N3S-B7SQ].
148. “Discursive” relates to the messages deployed and disseminated by the ASM
and the influence it has over private and state actors.
149. David Yerushalmi, a lawyer that has drafted legislation portraying Sharia as a
great threat to the United States, revealed, “If this [anti-Sharia legislation] passed in
every state without any friction, it would have not served its purpose . . . . The purpose
was heuristic—to get people asking this question, ‘What is Shariah?’” Andrea Elliott,
The Man Behind the Anti-Shariah Movement, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2011), https://www
.nytimes.com/2011/07/31/us/31shariah.html [https://perma.cc/AN4G-EADC].
150. Id.
151. “If you can’t move policy at the federal level, well, where do you go? . . . You go
to the states,” stated Yerushalmi, showing the ASM’s focus on the states as the forums
to mobilize popular and political opposition to Sharia law. Id.
152. See Why American Laws for American Courts?, AM. L. FOR AM. CTS. [hereinafter
ALAC Model Statute], http://americanlawsforamericancourts.com [https://perma
.cc/3BSH-L9WY] (presenting “model” anti-Sharia ALAC legislation).
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1. The Campaign
2010 marked a second highpoint in the course of “American Islamophobia.”153 Converging political currents ripened the soil for the
rise of the ASM and the deep political and popular impact it would
have in the decade. Two years into his first term, President Obama
faced a barrage of rumors, propagated by elements on the Right, that
he was “secretly a Muslim.”154 The upstart Tea Party captured scores
of congressional seats in the 2010 mid-term election from Democrats
and emerged as an influential player on the national political scene.155
And, nearly a decade after the 9/11 terror attacks, an embellished controversy around the “Ground Zero mosque” further fueled anti-Muslim fervor across the country.156
Together, these events and the War on Terror (continuing into its
second decade) created a landscape for the ASM to register unprecedented support among reactionary legislators across the nation.157
The symbiotic relationship between the ASM and its legislative interlocutors proved beneficial to both: the introduction of anti-Sharia bills
would shore up voting bases for far right legislators and carry the antiSharia message and mission deep inside the halls of state legislatures
and ancillary government bodies.
153. The Author dubs “American Islamophobia” as the nearly two decades’ long
climate and culture of anti-Muslim hostility that followed the 9/11 terror attacks. For
a more comprehensive analysis, see generally KHALED A. BEYDOUN, AMERICAN ISLAMOPHOBIA: UNDERSTANDING THE ROOTS AND RISE OF FEAR (2018).
154. See Republicans Believe Obama Is Muslim, PEW RSCH. CTR.: FACT TANK (Sept. 13,
2010), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2010/09/13/republicans-believe
-obama-is-a-muslim [https://perma.cc/EU87-2K2S]. Donald Trump has been one of
the most resounding propagators of this rumor, which became part of his “birther”
conspiracy in 2011. See, e.g., Chris Moody & Kristen Holmes, Donald Trump’s History of
Suggesting Obama Is a Muslim, CNN POL. (Sept. 18, 2015, 9:04 PM), https://www.cnn
.com/2015/09/18/politics/trump-obama-muslim-birther/index.html [https://
perma.cc/WW28-CUGT].
155. See John H. Aldrich, Bradford H. Bishop, Rebecca S. Hatch, D. Sunshine Hillygus & David W. Rohde, Blame, Responsibility, and the Tea Party in the 2010 Midterm
Elections, 36 POL. BEHAV. 471 (2014), for a political analysis that argues how rising popular opposition to President Obama and a recovering economy contributed to the success of the Tea Party in the 2010 midterm elections.
156. Chris McGreal, Ground Zero Mosque Plans ‘Fueling Anti-Muslim Protests Across
the US,’ GUARDIAN (Aug. 12, 2010, 3:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2010/aug/12/ground-zero-mosque-islamophobia [https://perma.cc/WX4L-EB9B]
(discussing a battle for plans to construct a mosque near the 9/11 World Trade Center
site).
157. “The ‘teavangelicals,’ as they have been dubbed, are an emotional and vocal
crew and have been on the frontlines of the Sharia scare that continues to grip the nation . . . .” NATHAN LEAN, THE ISLAMOPHOBIA INDUSTRY: HOW THE RIGHT MANUFACTURES FEAR
OF MUSLIMS 11 (2012).
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The anti-Sharia model statute provided the legislative template
for the Movement. Titled “American Laws for American Courts”
(ALAC), the model statute provided the boilerplate language for state
legislators seeking to introduce copycat, or analogous, bills:
The [general assembly/legislature] finds that it shall be the public policy
of this state to protect its citizens from the application of [Sharia law] when
the application of a foreign law will result in the violation of a right guaranteed by the constitution of this state or of the United States, including but not
limited to due process, freedom of religion, speech, or press, and any right of
privacy or marriage as specifically defined by the constitution of this state.158

The per se objective of the model statute—to prohibit state
courts from citing Sharia law—was narrow.159 However, its prefatory
language not only superseded its intended technical effect160 but also
revealed the genuine intent of its framer. Sharia and Islamic law were
characterized as antithetical to core constitutional liberties161 and oriented as a civilizational threat to American life.162 More than a mere
terror threat, the ASM positioned Islam as the existential nemesis of
the United States, and it projected these fears onto Muslim institutions—particularly mosques and other religious institutions.
Moreover, the model statute offered no definition of “Sharia” or
Islamic law.163 This enabled proponents of legislative proposals to
158. ALAC Model Statute, supra note 152.
159. Id.
160. The model statute sought to prohibit state courts from citing Islamic law.
However, bills inspired by the model statute had broader scopes. The most notable
example of this is the Tennessee bill enacted in 2011, which included criminal action
against parties that are part of any “Sharia organizations” which it defined as “two (2)
or more persons conspiring to support, or acting in concert in support of, sharia or in
furtherance of the imposition of sharia within any state or territory of the United
States.” S. 1028, 107th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011). The bill’s ambiguous definition of “sharia” seemed intentional, which extended great latitude to the courts and
law enforcement.
161. “America has unique values of liberty which do not exist in foreign legal systems, particularly Shariah Law. Included among . . . those values and rights are: Freedom of Religion, Freedom of Speech, Freedom of the Press, Due Process, Right to Privacy, [and] Right to Keep and Bear Arms.” ALAC Model Statute, supra note 152.
162. “Unfortunately, increasingly, foreign law and legal doctrines, including Shariah law principles, are finding their way into US court cases. Reviews of state laws
provide extensive evidence that foreign laws and legal doctrines are introduced into
US state court cases, including, notably, Islamic law known as Shariah . . . .” Id.
163. This was likely by design. The ASM sought to fill this vacuum with existing
misconceptions of Sharia law, which were shaped by “the redeployment of old Orientalist tropes” after 9/11 that cast Islam as foreign, violent, and un-American. See Leti
Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575, 1586 (2002), which references the longstanding misrepresentations branded upon Islam and Muslims by the
epistemological dialectic Edward Said coined as “Orientalism.” Said theorized this dialectic as a process whereby the West, or the “Occident,” defined itself as the mirror
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frame Sharia in line with their political views and interests. In light of
the times in which the model statute was introduced, this statutory
ambiguity invited merciless and maligned definitions of Islam as a system inherently wed to violence and “conquest”164 and provided a strategic void that reactionary politicians were keen on filling with vile
caricatures of Islam.165
Legislation adopting or inspired by the model statute quickly followed. Fourteen bills were introduced in 2010, and fifty-two bills
were presented within state legislatures the following year.166 The
growing political presence of Tea Party politicians within state legislatures across the country drove the ASM’s political campaign forward, spurring the introduction of twenty-seven, thirty-five, and
thirty bills in 2012, 2013, and 2014, respectively.167 Buoyed by its immediate political success, the ASM’s popular resonance erupted, evidenced by the wave of anti-Sharia protests staged across the

opposite image of the Muslim world, which comprised a segment of the “Orient.” See
generally EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM (1978).
164. See Asifa Quraishi-Landes, Five Myths About Sharia, WASH. POST (June 24,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/five-myths-about-sharia/2016/
06/24/7e3efb7a-31ef-11e6-8758-d58e76e11b12_story.html. Quraishi-Landes demystifies the tropes that “Sharia Law” is Islamic law, the widespread belief that “sharia
is the law of the land” in Muslim-majority countries, that “Sharia is anti-woman,” that
“Islam demands brutal punishments” and corporal punishment, and most germane to
the political narrative pushed by Sharia bill proponents, that “Sharia is about conquest.” Id.
165. Bill Ketron, who introduced several anti-Sharia bills in Tennessee beginning
in 2010, said the following of Islam (in relation to the Murfreesboro mosque dispute,
closely examined in Part IV.A of this Article):
What if they put in something that’s dangerous to the citizens or the children
of the neighborhood? . . . There should be notice of what’s changing. Does the
KKK have a church? Do snake handlers have a church? Those are things that
should be brought out to the general public. The more transparent we are to
the general public, the better off we are.
Jeff Woods, Ketron Compares Muslims to Snake Handlers, NASHVILLE SCENE (July 1,
2010, 9:00 AM), https://www.nashvillescene.com/news/pith-in-the-wind/article/
13034608/ketron-compares-muslims-to-snake-handlers [https://perma.cc/PF8Q
-437C].
166. Swathi Shanmugasundaram, Anti-Sharia Law Bills in the United States, S. POVERTY L. CTR. (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.splcenter.org/hatewatch/2018/02/05/anti
-sharia-law-bills-united-states [https://perma.cc/UN47-B9SY].
167. Id.
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country168 and the marked uptick in land use discrimination against
Muslims beginning in 2011.169
At the height of its momentum, the ASM faced legal challenges
that forced it to change course. In the 2012 case Awad v. Ziriax, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down the Oklahoma “Save Our
State” anti-Sharia legislation on establishment clause grounds.170 Despite the positive ruling, the litigation fed into the ASM’s grand design
of keeping the discourse around Sharia law embedded in the headlines and on the lips of politicians, pundits, and private citizens. The
effect of Awad on the ASM’s political campaign was minimal, as the
campaign’s architect David Yerushalmi replaced “Shariah law” with
“foreign law” in the model statute171 and instructed state legislators
pushing copycat bills to do the same. However, unlike the intellectual
discourse among jurists and scholars debating the place of foreign law
in American courts,172 the ASM wholly conflated foreign law with Islamic law: the intended and only target.173
The rise of Donald Trump onto the national political scene in
2015 provided the ASM with a presidential candidate who trumpeted
168. A number of these protests were held in front of mosques. See, e.g., Tom Dart,
Protesters Decry Islam Outside Phoenix Mosque: ‘They Want To Take Over,’ GUARDIAN
(Oct. 10, 2015, 6:34 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/oct/10/anti
-islam-protest-phoenix-islamic-community-center [https://perma.cc/GA2G-ZRLZ].
The Phoenix protest was one of many anti-Islam protests held in front of mosques on
the weekend of October 10, 2015. Id.
169. 2016 DOJ RLUIPA REPORT, supra note 15, at 4.
170. Awad v. Ziriax, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1206 (W.D. Okla. 2013), aff’d. 670 F.3d
1111 (10th Cir. 2012).
Having reviewed the numerous statements by the legislators who authored
the amendment, it is abundantly clear that the primary purpose of the
amendment was to specifically target and outlaw Sharia law and to act as a
preemptive strike against Sharia law to protect Oklahoma from a perceived
“threat” of Sharia law being utilized in Oklahoma Courts.
Id.
171. ALAC Model Statute, supra note 152.
172. Law scholars, including Steven G. Calabresi, view the United States and its
courts as part of a global legal community. In line with this internationalist perspective,
comity and engagement with the opinions and rulings of foreign courts can be instructive or persuasive authority for American judges. See Steven G. Calabresi & Bradley G.
Silverman, Hayek and the Citation of Foreign Law: A Response to Professor Jeremy Waldron, 2015 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 18. Meanwhile, thinkers including Eugene Volokh and
Justice Antonin Scalia are fearful of foreign law’s capacity to influence and even redefine constitutional principles. See Eugene Volokh, Foreign Law in American Courts, 66
OKLA. L. REV. 219 (2014).
173. This is further revealed in the ALAC model statute, which only makes specific
mention of “Shariah Law” and no other “foreign” legal systems in its prefatory passages. ALAC Model Statute, supra note 149.
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the very anti-Muslim rhetoric it peddled.174 Trump’s presidential victory fueled the ASM with increased momentum to churn out thirtythree, twelve, fourteen,175 and twenty-one more bills from 2015
through 2018, respectively.176 The Trump presidency availed the ASM
and conservative politicians peddling bills with a de facto spokesman
that promoted the same messages of “Sharia takeover” and “civilizational threat” from the highest office in the land.177 In fact, while on
the campaign trail, Trump turned his ire toward American mosques,
claiming, “We’re going to have no choice [but to close some
mosques].”178 Such statements by Trump intensified the very fears
projected by the ASM that mosques and Muslim religious institutions
at large symbolized national security and civilizational threats.
From 2010 to 2016, the ASM inspired the introduction of 194
anti-Sharia bills.179 Eighteen bills were enacted, with several state legislatures debating copycat bills.180 Thus far, all but seven of the fifty
states have had at least one anti-Sharia bill introduced within their
174. See Khaled A. Beydoun, “Muslim Bans” and the (Re)Making of Political Islamophobia, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1733, 1756–60 (detailing President Trump’s “Muslim ban”
and other anti-Muslim rhetoric).
175. Shanmugasundaram, supra note 166.
176. The Author counted this number of anti-Sharia bills introduced in 2018.
177. Trump’s rhetoric embraces the view that the United States, and the West at
large, is engaged in a civilizational war with Islam. This belief was revealed by his infamous “I think Islam hates us” statement made in response to a question by CNN’s
Anderson Cooper six months before winning the 2016 presidential election. Theodore
Schleifer, Donald Trump: ‘I Think Islam Hates Us,’ CNN POL. (Mar. 10, 2016, 5:56 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2016/03/09/politics/donald-trump-islam-hates-us/index
.html [https://perma.cc/MWU5-QEH3]. Samuel P. Huntington popularized this
worldview, which orients Islam as the West’s civilizational nemesis. See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER
(1996). Huntington’s theory, dubbed the “clash of civilizations,” did not narrowly pit
the United States against “Islamic fundamentalism,” but the whole of Islam. See Samuel
P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations?, 72 FOREIGN AFFS. 22 (1993).
178. Nick Gass, Trump: ‘Absolutely No Choice’ But To Close Mosques, POLITICO (Nov.
18, 2015, 6:45 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2015/11/trump-close-mosques
-216008 [https://perma.cc/PU69-YCRQ].
179. See ELSADIG ELSHEIKH, BASIMA SISEMORE, & NATALIA RAMIREZ LEE, HAAS INST. FOR
A FAIR & INCLUSIVE SOC’Y, LEGALIZING OTHERING: THE UNITED STATES OF ISLAMAPHOBIA 8
(2017), https://belonging.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/haas_institute_legalizing_
othering_the_united_states_of_islamophobia.pdf [https://perma.cc/ATM7-PKBU].
180. Id.; see also Dustin Gardiner & Mark Olaide, These Copycat Bills on Sharia Law
and Terrorism Have No Effect. Why Do States Keep Passing Them?, USA TODAY (Nov. 19,
2019), https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/news/investigations/2019/07/17/
islam-sharia-law-how-far-right-group-gets-model-bills-passed/1636199001
[https://perma.cc/3WAP-FPG4] (discussing states with anti-Sharia bills currently being debated within their legislatures and, more broadly, the considerable influence the
ASM still holds as it transitions into its second decade).
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state legislatures.181 This national reach illustrates that ASM’s political
and discursive impact is hardly confined to any one region.
2. Base Audience
The ASM’s legal campaign found the most resonance within “red
states,”182 where the highest numbers of anti-Sharia bills were introduced.183 Since 2018, the majority of the total 216 anti-Sharia bills
were introduced in red states. The ASM found its most receptive audiences within “deep red states,”184 such as Texas, Mississippi, and Indiana, where the highest number of anti-Sharia bills were introduced—
with twenty-one, twenty, and thirteen bills, respectively.185
Figure 4, below, illustrates the intimate correlation between the
political composition of state legislatures and the number of anti-Sharia bills introduced. The number of introduced bills indicates the political commitment on the part of a legislator (or group of legislators)
to enact a bill and, more saliently, to keep the fears centering on Sharia
a prominent subject of discussion within the state senate, house of
representatives, and, ideally for the ASM, both.

181. Islamophobia: Overview of Bills, OTHERING & BELONGING INST. UC BERKELEY
(2018), https://belonging.berkeley.edu/global-justice/islamophobia [https://perma
.cc/76QJ-K69L].
182. This Article defines “red states” as states with majority Republican state legislatures. See State Partisan Composition, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Sept. 8, 2020),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/partisan-composition.aspx
[https://perma.cc/WEY3-XDFQ].
183. Compare Islamophobia: Overview of Bills, supra note 181, with State Partisan
Composition, supra note 182.
184. This Article defines “deep red states” as Republican “trifectas,” wherein the
state legislature and the gubernatorial seat are held by Republicans. See State Government Trifectas, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/State_government_trifectas
[https://perma.cc/WLM8-N2T9].
185. Islamophobia: Overview of Bills, supra note 181.
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Figure 4 | Number of Anti-Sharia Bills Introduced by State (2018)186
Twelve of the thirteen states that enacted anti-Sharia measures
are red states.187 Washington, which enacted anti-Sharia legislation in
2015,188 is the only blue state among the thirteen.189 Eleven states that
enacted anti-Sharia legislation are definitively red states,190 while Arizona’s increasingly bipartisan legislature inches it closer to purple,
swing-state status.191 Louisiana and Tennessee were the first to enact
anti-Sharia measures in 2010, followed by Arizona and Texas in
2011.192 Tennessee, home to the Murfreesboro mosque opposed by
town residents, is closely examined in Section IV.A. The most recent
states to enact anti-Sharia bills are Arkansas and Texas, which passed
copycat laws in 2017.193
186. The asterisk represents a blue state—or a state with a majority Democratic
state legislature. Not depicted on the map: Connecticut (1), Delaware (2), Hawaii (1),
New Hampshire (2), and Vermont (1). Id.
187. Compare id., with State Partisan Composition, supra note 182.
188. See S. 5498, 64th Leg., 2015 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015).
189. See State Partisan Composition, supra note 182.
190. Compare Islamophobia: Overview of Bills, supra note 181, with State Partisan
Composition, supra note 182.
191. See generally Reid Wilson, Dems See Arizona Desert Blooming Blue, HILL (Mar.
27, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/435948-dems-see
-arizona-desert-blooming-blue [https://perma.cc/EM2T-6Y74].
192. See Islamophobia: Overview of Bills, supra note 181.
193. Id.
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State
Arkansas
Alabama
Arizona
Florida
Kansas
Louisiana

Enacted
2017
2013
2011
2014
2012
2010

Scope
Courts restricted from citing foreign law
Courts restricted from citing foreign law
Courts restricted from citing foreign law
Courts restricted from citing foreign law
Courts restricted from citing foreign law
Courts restricted from citing foreign law

Mississippi
North Carolina
Oklahoma
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Washington

2015
2013
2013
2012
2010
2011
2015

Courts restricted from citing foreign law
Restricted from citing foreign family law
Courts restricted from citing Sharia law
Courts restricted from citing Islamic law
Criminal restrictions against Sharia law
Courts restricted from citing foreign law
Courts restricted from citing foreign law

Figure 5 | States That Enacted Anti-Sharia Legislation194
Again, according to its architect, the ASM’s heuristic and discursive impact is the true barometer of its success, rather than the passage of bills.195 Enacted legislation is best understood as a windfall,
with the real prize being the potency and penetration of the bills’ messages into public life.
The ASM is still alive and pushing forward. A number of states,
including Wyoming and Idaho, have introduced bills to prohibit state
courts from citing Sharia law.196 In addition to expanding vertically,
the ASM has inspired collateral anti-Muslim legislation. In Tennessee,
which enacted the most draconian anti-Sharia bill in 2011,197 its proponent sought to pass a bill that would classify neighborhoods with
mosques, Muslim schools, and other centers of Muslim life as “no-go
zones”198—the idea being that these areas are places the public should

194. Id.
195. Elliott, supra note 149.
196. See State Legislation Restricting Use of Foreign or Religious Law, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Apr. 8, 2013), https://www.pewforum.org/2013/04/08/state-legislation-restricting
-use-of-foreign-or-religious-law [https://perma.cc/99WG-YEY8].
197. The Tennessee legislation would make “adherence to Shariah a felony, punishable by up to fifteen years in prison.” See Ali, supra note 22, at 1065.
198. See Julia Craven, Tennessee’s Latest Bill Bans Nonexistent Muslim ‘No-Go Zones,’
HUFFPOST: POL. (Mar. 3, 2015, 6:19 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/tennessee
-no-go-zones_n_6795028 [https://perma.cc/Z4PR-KUXP].
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avoid because they have been fully taken over by Sharia law.199 In Arkansas, the same representative who introduced the state’s anti-Sharia legislation proposed a measure that would prohibit law enforcement from working with the Council on American-Islamic Relations
(CAIR), the largest Muslim advocacy organization in the United
States.200
The ASM’s political reach and resonance is not limited to state
legislatures. Its discursive imprint manifested as the actions of local
governments and private citizens who signed petitions in favor of prospective anti-Sharia legislation, cast votes for politicians campaigning
to “ban Sharia,” and consumed the ubiquitous media that forewarned
the oncoming menace of “Sharia law into their communities.”201
B. DISCURSIVE EFFECT
The ASM’s political campaign served as the strategic springboard
for its mass mis-education campaign. The 216 bills introduced across
forty-three states over the span of nearly a decade proved to be potent
catalysts for stirring popular hysteria against the oncoming threat of
Sharia law.202 This hysteria was most pronounced in red states, where
the majority of the anti-Sharia bills were introduced and twelve of the
thirteen laws were enacted.203
Beyond just spreading hysteria, the ASM provoked action on the
part of the masses to stand against the construction of mosques, Muslim cemeteries, and Muslim schools within their cities and towns—
entities that they interpreted as the coming of Sharia law into their
towns. Therefore, as envisioned by its architect and the legislators introducing and advancing bills within their state legislatures, the ASM
sought to provoke public vigilance and action against the creation of
Muslim institutions. This Section analyzes the discursive impact of
199. See, e.g., David Emery, Did Somali Muslims Take Over a Small Tennessee Town?,
SNOPES (July 31, 2017), https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/somali-muslims
-tennessee-town [https://perma.cc/U6QP-J9WR] (illustrating the popular view—and
fear—that Muslims took over the small central Tennessee town of Shelbyville).
200. H.R. 1006, 92d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2019).
201. See David Mikkelson, Was Sharia Law Established in Texas?, SNOPES (Aug. 14,
2016), https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/sharia-law-texas, for an example of media stoking the very fears behind the twenty-two anti-Sharia bills introduced in Texas.
For an example of this brand of media fearmongering from a prominent anti-Muslim
figure, see Pamela Geller, Islamic Law Comes to Dearborn, BREITBART (Apr. 22, 2011),
https://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2011/04/22/islamic-law-comes-to
-dearborn [https://perma.cc/3TBT-X2NU].
202. See supra Part II.A.2.
203. Id.
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anti-Sharia legislation on the public, followed by how its mandate of
prohibited Sharia law was projected onto municipal boards and planning commissions presiding over Muslim land use petitions.
1. Coercing Action
Scholars within and beyond legal academe have theorized the
law’s capacity to shape norms and drive culture.204 Specifically, scholars have examined the law’s potency to form views and behaviors
among the polity during moments of crisis, most notably during times
of traditional war or the lifespans of entrapping “forever wars.”205
War, whether conventional or existential, pronounces law’s capacity
to shape the ideas and drive the actions of an impassioned polity. The
ASM, seizing upon the fears and passions stirred against Islam by the
War on Terror, paints a more ominous threat of civilizational war
against the Islamic faith and its conspicuous symbols.206
In Law as Culture,207 law scholar Naomi Mezey builds on Michel
Foucault’s central thesis that law’s discursive effect materially shapes
popular ideas and behavior.208 Mezey theorizes:
[L]aw’s power is discursive and productive as well as coercive. Law participates in the production of meanings within the shared semiotic system of
a culture, but is also a product of that culture and the practices that reproduce
it . . . . As Alan Hunt explains, “[L]aw is implicated in social practices, as an
always potentially present dimension of social relations, while at the same
time . . . is itself the product of the play and struggle of social relations.”209

204. Here, the Author is referring to the “law” in the broadest sense. Specifically,
law as an institution, which exercises its normative-making power typically through
the acts of the executive, the courts, and per the focus of this Part of the Article, legislation.
205. The Author borrows the term “forever wars” from author Mark Danner to refer to the amorphous cultural or ideological campaigns the state formally refers to as
wars, such as the War on Drugs or the War on Terror: campaigns that are far more than
merely military standoffs between nations. See generally MARK DANNER, SPIRAL:
TRAPPED IN THE FOREVER WAR (2016).
206. The ASM adopts the “clash of civilizations” worldview theorized by Huntington. See generally HUNTINGTON, supra note 177; Hatem Bazian, Islamophobia, “Clash of
Civilizations”, and Forging a Post-Cold War Order!, 9 RELIGIONS 228 (2018) (discussing
Islamophobia in relation to Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” theory); ELSHEIKH ET
AL., supra note 179, at 26.
207. See generally Naomi Mezey, Law as Culture, 13 YALE J. L. & HUMANS. 35 (2001).
208. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH (Alan Sheridan trans.,
Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1977), for a seminal text by the French philosopher who
theorizes the power of law in shaping cultural norms, examined within the scope of
the French penal system.
209. Mezey, supra note 207, at 47 (citing ALAN HUNT, EXPLORATIONS IN LAW AND SOCIETY: TOWARD A CONSTITUTIVE THEORY OF LAW (1993)).
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Mezey’s framing of law as a fluid dialectic between law and members of the polity, or what sociologist Alan Hunt dubs a “constitutive
theory of law,”210 reveals the pointedly discursive mission of the ASM.
More specifically, it elucidates the process by which the threats forewarned by anti-Sharia bills shape how local governments and members of the polity interpret Islam and ascribe meaning to its adherents
and institutions. This discursive impact of law is more forceful during
crisis, real or perceived.211
Stated simply, one may think about this theorized dialectic in
terms of an interconnected network: first, a message; second, messengers; third, conduits; and fourth, a target audience. The threats posed
by Sharia packaged in the ASM model statute, in this instance, comprise the bundle of messages. These core messages are carried forward by ASM brass nationally and state legislators within their home
states, who function as the principal anti-Sharia messengers. Next,
these messengers capitalize on the media, political campaigns, and
state legislatures to disseminate their bundle of anti-Sharia messages
to their respective audiences. The ASM’s audience is a broad and national one, while the strategic audience for state legislators includes
local governments, which include city boards and planning commissions presiding over land use applications made by Muslim parties.
Figure 6, below, graphically illustrates the process and parts of this
dialectic, highlighting how the ASM’s expanding audience and appeal
fuel its political momentum moving forward.

210. ALAN HUNT, EXPLORATIONS IN LAW AND SOCIETY: TOWARD A CONSTITUTIVE THEORY
OF LAW 3 (1993).
211. The ASM claims that the United States is interlocked in a civilizational war
with Islam and a broader cultural war where its values are in jeopardy. See supra note
206 and accompanying text.
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ASM MESSAGE
Sharia is violent, Islam is
foreign, un-American

AUDIENCE

MESSENGERS

local governments, planning
commissions, constituents

ASM leadership, state
legislators, pundits

CONDUITS
state legislatures, media,
political campaigns

Figure 6 | The ASM as a Popular Dialectic
The “semiotic” bundle of meanings—such as foreign, violent, and
un-American—the ASM ascribes to Islam212 and Muslim institutions
such as mosques, cemeteries, and schools is exceptionally menacing
within contexts where the ASM is especially resonant. Within these
contexts, Muslim institutions become standing symbols for the very
threats flagged by the ASM and, in turn, zealously opposed. In his landmark work Stigma, noted social psychologist Erving Goffman dubbed
these negative symbolic meanings assigned to collective groups, including faith groups and their religious institutions (such as synagogues or mosques targeted by anti-Semitic or anti-Muslim animus),
“tribal stigmas.”213
More than merely disseminating negative messages and images
about the threat of Sharia law, the ASM capitalizes on state legislation
to provoke action against perceived symbols of that threat among the
audience (citizenry). Mezey dubs this dynamic the “productive”
power of law,214 while legal philosopher Ekow N. Yankah observes the
212. Mezey, supra note 207, at 47 (using “semiotic” to explain the assignment of
negative stereotypes and stigma to Muslim entities).
213. ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY 11–
12 (1963). Goffman’s analysis of tribal stigma is rooted in his foundational framing of
“stigma” as “the situation of the individual who is disqualified from full social acceptance.” Id. at xi.
214. Mezey, supra note 207, at 47.
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more forceful effect law has on human action as its “coercive
power.”215 Although both Mezey and Yankah focus on the law’s capacity to prompt action, the distinction between its productive and coercive power is a salient one for purposes of this Article. The coercive
power of law—or a law’s increased capacity to spur action—entails
greater impact.
The ASM’s coercive effect illustrates how it prompts both private
and public actors to curtail the religious freedom of Muslims. Constitutional law scholar Lauren Sudeall Lucas’s framing of “projective
claims of religious identity,” articulated in her article The Free Exercise
of Religious Identity,216 theorizes how Yankah’s articulation of coercive power unfolds to deny the free exercise rights of vulnerable
groups, including Muslims within the land use context. By “imposing”
a castigatory view of Islam as a means to prevent expression of Muslim identity and establishment of Muslim institutions,217 the ASM’s
projective impact is manifested by local governments that deny the
land use requests of Muslim parties. Stated simply, the ASM’s antiMuslim messages influence local governments to deny Muslims petitions to build mosques, cemeteries, and schools by branding them as
subversive, sacrilegious, or uncivilized. In turn, this infringes upon the
religious freedom of Muslims in order to accommodate the castigatory
religious (and political) ideas imposed by the ASM.
As theorized above and analyzed closely in the five RLUIPA cases
and controversies in Part III, the ASM’s coercive impact was not uniform across the country. A range of variables collectively impacts the
reach and resonance of the ASM as well as the impact it has on local
governments. Those variables include the frequency and number of
anti-Sharia bills introduced within a state, the enactment of a law, the
nature and gravity of the rhetoric surrounding the bill(s), the degree
of media coverage, litigation, and the visible presence or lack of a Muslim population.

215. Ekow N. Yankah, The Force of Law: The Role of Coercion in Legal Norms, 42 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1195 (2008).
216. Sudeall Lucas, supra note 84, at 96.
217. Id.
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2. Public Covenants
Since September 2010, the ASM’s influence on Muslim land use
determinations has been considerable.218 The projective impact is illustrated by the civic opposition that brands Muslim land use requests
for mosques, cemeteries, and schools as oncoming embodiments of
Sharia law.219 This high clip (36%) of DOJ investigations involving a
Muslim land use request220 and staunch refusal (80%) to settle Muslim land disputes without federal action manifests the coercive impact
of the ASM on local governments.221

Figure 7 | Municipal Assignment of Sharia Threat to Muslim Institutions
Beyond statistics, this opposition manifests itself in three ways.
First, local government bodies tasked with determining the legality of
land use applications may have internal discriminatory motives222
and may seek to build support among their constituents to support a
negative ruling. This internal discriminatory motive may be explicit,
or, as illustrated in United States v. Pittsfield Charter Township,223

218. See 2016 DOJ RLUIPA REPORT, supra note 15, at 3.
219. Sudeall Lucas, supra note 84, at 96 (using “projective identity” as a forceful
imposition of one identity as a way to prevent or preempt another’s religious expression).
220. 2016 DOJ RLUIPA REPORT, supra note 15, at 4.
221. Id. at 6.
222. Government bodies like city planning commissions or boards are typically extended administrative authority to make land use determinations. Legislative v. QuasiJudicial Land Use Decisions, IOWA ST. U.: EXTENSION & OUTREACH, https://www.extension
.iastate.edu/communities/legislative-v-quasi-judicial-land-use-decisions [https://
perma.cc/PJX5-6CLP].
223. No. 2:15-cv-13779 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 14, 2016).
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examined in Section III.C, guised. This Article will refer to this brand
of municipal opposition as a “public covenant.”
Second, popular opposition against a Muslim land use request
may put pressure on local governments to deny it. In this instance, the
discursive effect of the ASM pushes private citizens to coalesce against
a proposed Muslim land use request and lobby the municipal board or
planning commission to vote against a Muslim land use petition. Faced
with this pressure and the political disincentives associated with disobeying popular will,224 local governments may endorse the popular
opposition against a Muslim land use request by rejecting an otherwise compliant petition. This de facto anti-Muslim covenant is illustrated in United States v. County of Culpeper225 and more zealously in
United States v. Rutherford County,226 both of which are closely examined in Section IV.A. This Article will refer to this as a “popular covenant.”
Third, local government and the polity may mount a united front
against the Muslim land use request whereby the anti-Muslim animus
of the state is wholly shared and reinforced by constituents on the
ground. This concerted opposition against Muslim land use requests
is most prevalent in red states,227 and it manifests the pronounced coercive impact of the ASM on the behavior of local government and the
people, which are collectively invested in preventing the construction
of a mosque, Muslim cemetery, or school. This entwined public opposition to Muslim land use requests is vividly illustrated in United States
v. City of Farmersville,228 analyzed in Subsection III.B.1. This Article
will refer to this mode of land use opposition as an “aligned covenant.”
These three covenants frame the distinct forms of opposition
feeding the uptick in land use discrimination faced by Muslims from
2010 through the present. The force of these covenants of religious
rage, assessed through statistics and then theory, will next be closely
examined through case law.

224. Specifically, fear of losing political popularity and, for local government employees in elected positions, being voted out of office.
225. United States v. Cnty. of Culpeper, 245 F. Supp. 3d 758, 763 (2017).
226. United States v. Rutherford Cnty., No. 12-0737, 2012 WL 2930076 (M.D. Tenn.
July 18, 2012).
227. See Anti-Muslim Activities in the United States 2012-2018, NEW AM., https://
www.newamerica.org/in-depth/anti-muslim-activity [https://perma.cc/94MS-7SKJ]
(indicating much opposition to mosques, Muslim cemeteries, and schools from 2012
to 2018 occurred in red states).
228. United States v. City of Farmersville, No. 4:19-cv-00285 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 16,
2019).
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III. COVENANTS OF RELIGIOUS RAGE
The ASM’s impact on local governments varies across geographic
and political lines. The degree of coercion it places on local governments presiding over Muslim land use petitions, and their constituents, hinges on the resonance of the anti-Sharia bills within the state
in which they were introduced. This resonance manifests itself in
three distinct fronts—or covenants—of opposition: public covenants,
popular covenants, and aligned covenants.
These distinct fronts of opposition share the common aim of
preempting the creation of a Muslim institution. The five cases examined below illustrate how these fronts of opposition unfold during the
course of land use disputes involving Muslim petitioners seeking to
establish mosques, Muslim cemeteries, and Muslim schools.229
A. AGAINST MOSQUES
The majority of land use disputes involving Muslims from 2010
through the present involve the creation or expansion of a mosque.
Mosques are, along with the headscarf,230 Islam’s most visible symbols. Beyond serving as a place for prayer and collective worship,
mosques also function as lifelines for Muslim social, cultural, and civic
engagement.
This Section examines the ASM’s impact in coercing public opposition to mosques in Culpeper, Virginia, where a mosque has never
stood before, and Murfreesboro, Tennessee, the site of a newly constructed mosque that became the epicenter of the state’s anti-Muslim
movement from 2011 through 2015.
1. United States v. Culpeper County
William C. Chase approached the microphone to announce the
Board of Supervisors’s decision. Five years had passed since the Islamic Center of Culpeper (ICC) commenced its search for a mosque,231
229. These five cases were chosen to highlight how the projective impact of the
ASM unfolds distinctly across geographic, political, and socioeconomic lines. The cases
arise from rural towns and suburbs, red and blue states, metropolitan areas with established Muslim communities and remote locales with sparse and new Muslim communities.
230. The headscarf, or “hijab,” is commonly referred to as the “flag of Islam.” It is
perceived by many to be a quintessential symbol of the religion. See Julie Anne Taylor,
Sanaa Ayoub & Fatima Moussa, The Hijab in Public Schools, 41 RELIGION & EDUC. 16, 26
(2014).
231. Complaint at 5, United States v. Cnty. of Culpeper, 245 F. Supp. 3d 758 (W.D.
Va. Dec. 12, 2016) (No. 3:16-cv-0083) [hereinafter U.S. Culpeper Complaint].
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which would be the first one ever in Culpeper County, Virginia.232 Mohammad Nawabe, the ICC’s director, purchased a structure that he
planned to convert into a mosque for the county’s small but growing
Muslim community.233 Per the instructions of the county’s health department, Nawabe filed an application for a “pump and haul” permit,234 which the Board had never denied before.235 In fact, since 1992,
the Board extended each and every one of the twenty-six applications
for septic tank permits, including the nine applications filed by the
town’s churches.236
April 5, 2016, marked a land use precedent for the county. Before
an audience of concerned townspeople, Chase announced the Board’s
4-3 vote denying the ICC’s application for a septic tank that would enable the creation of the county’s first mosque.237 The Board’s denial
was met with raucous cheers and applause from the audience.238 This
was a response that, given the popular resistance against the prospective mosque during the years preceding the Board hearing, manifested
concern for more than just an administrative land use matter. On that
day, the ICC and Islam, the target of four anti-Sharia bills introduced
in the Virginia state legislature,239 were on trial. The septic tank denial
was pretext for religious discrimination, and the Board’s final vote
manifested assent to the popular opposition against a mosque being
established in Culpeper County.
Public opponents of the planned mosque actively lobbied the
Culpeper Board of Supervisors before they issued their final decision
on the ICC’s request.240 Kurt Christensen, a “well-known civic leader,”
emailed Board members, the county administrator, and local media
two days before the originally scheduled March hearing, writing,
“[The ICC] wishes to rehabilitate the existing home [on the Property]
and use it on a weekly basis as a place of prayer. . . .
Hmmmmmmmmm . . . .”241 He then ordered the Board to “pull th[e]
232. Id. at 4.
233. Id. at 5.
234. A “pump and haul” is a septic tank system used when soil absorption on a
property is insufficient for its stated use. Id.
235. Id. at 9.
236. Id. at 3.
237. Id. at 9.
238. Id.
239. Islamophobia: Overview of Bills, supra note 181.
240. U.S. Culpeper Complaint, supra note 231, at 7 (“Between the March 1 and April
5, 2016 Board meetings, the County received numerous emails and phone calls from
constituents opposing ICC’s pump and haul application.”).
241. Id. at 6.
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item from the March meeting agenda and give citizens a detailed briefing pronto.”242
Christensen urged the Board to convert an internal administrative matter into one of public concern.243 His note was followed by
scores of phone calls and emails sent to the Board from concerned Culpeper residents.244 The content of their messages tied the ICC to terrorism and the 9/11 terror attacks,245 echoing the very stereotypes
peddled by anti-Sharia proponents within and beyond the state of Virginia.246
The Board assented to the popular call for a public hearing.247
Concerned with the “barrage of emails and phone calls” from Culpeper
residents, Board chairwoman Alexa Fritz emailed the county administrator three days before the hearing.248 “It just keeps coming back to
the same question—why is this request subject to more scrutiny and
tighter interpretation of the policy than all the past requests?”249 the
administrator responded, indicating that the popular covenant opposing the ICC’s application had considerable influence on Fritz’s fellow
Board supervisors. The surge of emails, phone calls, and private meetings with Board members emerged from the shadows and formed a
raucous crowd inside the county building on the day of the hearing.250
Taken by the size and zeal of the crowd, the Board capitulated to this
private covenant by denying the ICC’s request to build a mosque.251

242. Id.
243. Yerushalmi argued that “there is a link between ‘Shariah-adherent behavior’
in American mosques and support for violent jihad.” Elliott, supra note 149. This thinking entwines religious worship within mosques with terror activity, which spurs the
suspicion displayed by Christensen’s email.
244. United States v. Cnty. of Culpeper, 245 F. Supp. 3d 758, 763 (W.D. Va. 2017).
245. Id.
246. In 2011, the DOJ filed a suit on behalf of the Muslim community in Henrico
County, Virginia (approximately 100 miles south of Culpeper), whereby county officials “discriminated against the [planned] Mosque on the basis of religion or religious
denomination, including making derogatory and discriminatory statements, and/or
treating the Mosque’s application less favorably than similar applications by non-Muslim houses of worship.” Complaint at 4–5, United States v. Cnty. of Henrico, No. 3:11cv-583 (E.D. Va. Sept. 6, 2011).
247. U.S. Culpeper Complaint, supra note 231, at 8 (“[The County Administrator]
informed Chairwoman Fritz that he would be prepared to cover the questions raised
by the community at the April 5 Board hearing.”).
248. Id. at 7.
249. Id. at 7–8.
250. Id. at 8 (noting that an audience was present at the hearing).
251. Id. at 9.
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The Board’s decision delivered what the townspeople wanted:
prevention of the creation of the ICC mosque. As a result, the county’s
Muslims would have to continue praying “at a small house on the site
of a used car dealership on Brandy Road”252 or make the forty-fiveminute drive to Charlottesville, Virginia, the site of the nearest
mosque.253 A septic tank permit, which the Board “granted as a matter
of course, with little fanfare or scrutiny,”254 emerged into a public referendum on Islam. It climaxed when the county endorsed the popular
covenant that the religion, and their planned mosque, had no place in
Culpeper.255
Seven months later, on December 12, 2016, the DOJ filed a
RLUIPA complaint against the County of Culpeper.256 The suit claimed
that the Board’s denial of the ICC’s septic tank application discriminated against them on grounds of their Muslim identity.257 The county
ultimately settled a related case brought by the ICC directly, delivering
the land use permit as part of the settlement, and the DOJ case was
dismissed as moot.258 The DOJ lawsuit overrode the public covenant
that temporarily preempted the construction of the ICC mosque. This
in turn opened the door for the creation of the first ever mosque in
Culpeper County’s 270-year history.259

252. Id. at 4.
253. Id. (“There is no mosque in the County. The closest mosque is approximately
forty-five minutes away by car, which is too far for most ICC members to drive for daily
prayers.”).
254. United States v. Cnty. of Culpeper, 245 F. Supp. 3d 758, 760 (W.D. Va. 2017).
255. U.S. Culpeper Complaint, supra note 231, at 10 (“In denying the ICC’s application, the County has used its pump and haul application review process as a means for
allowing land uses that it desires and excluding a use that it is does not want in the
County.”).
256. See id.
257. The United States’ complaint claimed that the County of Culpeper’s denial of
a pump and haul permit “imposed a substantial burden on the ICC’s religious exercise
in violation” of RLUIPA § 2000cc(a)(1). Id. Secondly, it discriminated on the basis of
religion, in violation of § 2000cc(b)(2). Id.
258. United States v. Cnty. of Culpeper, No. 3:16-cv-00083, 2017 WL 3835601, at
*1 (W.D. Va. Sept. 1, 2017).
259. See Allison Brophy Champion, After Resolution of Federal Lawsuit, Culpeper’s
First Mosque Is on Course for 2020, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www
.richmond.com/news/virginia/after-resolution-of-federal-lawsuit-culpeper-s-first
-mosque-is/article_06bf935f-4b03-59e6-9bf8ae63edb02e11.html [https://perma.cc/
8LSC-4CM3].
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2. United States v. Rutherford County
On July 1, 2011, the Tennessee legislature enacted the nation’s
most draconian anti-Sharia law.260 The year before, the Islamic Center
of Murfreesboro (ICM) had purchased property in the town roughly
thirty miles southeast of Nashville as the site of its new mosque.261
The mosque would include a cemetery, a school, and a park262
and would serve as a community center for Murfreesboro’s rapidly
growing Muslim population.263 The ICM needed municipal approval of
their site plan to move forward with building. For proponents of Tennessee’s recently ratified anti-Sharia law and the legions opposing the
ICM’s land use request, the proposed mosque represented a “Sharia
organization” that would serve as the local engine of “impos[ing] sharia” within Murfreesboro and beyond.264
The threat projected onto mosques by the ASM, explicitly bolstered by the state’s enacted anti-Sharia bill, made Murfreesboro and
the ICM the center of the state’s ASM storm. After procuring approval
for their site plan from the Rutherford County Regional Planning Commission (RCRPC) on May 24, 2010,265 the ICM faced the far more
daunting public trial standing between it and the realization of its new
mosque. Six months after the Board’s approval, a group of county residents opposing the construction of the mosque sued the RCRPC, in
state court, for issuing a land use decision without adequately notifying the public about the hearing.266 These residents sought to enforce
their popular covenant through a court order.

260. S. 1028, 170th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011).
261. Fisher v. Rutherford Cnty. Reg’l Plan. Comm’n, No. M2012-01397-COA-R3-CV,
2013 WL 2382300, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 29, 2013).
262. Id.
263. There are no official figures of the actual count of the Muslim population in
Murfreesboro. But the prominence of the Muslim population in the Tennessee town
was highlighted by the scrutiny it faced during the ICM mosque dispute and the national media attention it garnered. For a recent profile on the Murfreesboro Muslim
community and the ICM, see Becca Andrews, Here’s What It’s Like To Be Muslim in the
Bible Belt in 2017, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.motherjones.com/
politics/2017/02/mosque-tennessee-syrian-refugees [https://perma.cc/MVL7
-LYUW].
264. Tenn. S. 1028.
265. Fisher, 2013 WL 2382300, at *1.
266. The group of county residents cited the Tennessee Open Meetings Act, TENN.
CODE ANN. § 8-44-101 (2019), as the basis of their challenge. Fisher, 2013 WL 2382300,
at *1.
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After two years of litigation, ICM’s opponents secured a favorable
state court ruling.267 The Tennessee court placed a temporary restraining order on the opening of the mosque, holding that “the significance of the matters decided and the overall general interest of the
community as a whole”268 encouraged the RCRPC to extend “the greatest notice available.”269 Like Culpeper, the only factor that made the
ICM’s land use request a matter of public concern was its Muslim character.270 Otherwise, it would have remained a mundane matter of administrative concern.
In other words, the ASM’s projective influence and branding of
mosques as oncoming symbols of “[Sharia] threat” pushed the
Murfreesboro residents to pursue years of litigation.271 This not only
mobilized litigation on the part of private citizens, but it ultimately
persuaded the state court judge that the ICM’s Muslim identity made
their land use request a matter of public concern.272 Beyond seeking
to prevent the opening of the mosque, the Murfreesboro residents
spearheaded a “movement” within the town that sought to popularly
enforce the anti-Sharia aims of the enacted legislation.273 This movement unfolded in court and in the community, and it descended into

267. Fisher, 2013 WL 2382300, at *2 (“[T]he trial court entered an order finding
that . . . the notice given for the May 24, 2010 regional planning commission meeting
did not comply with the Open Meetings Act and that, therefore, the decision of the regional planning commission regarding the ICM site plan at that meeting was void ab
initio.”).
268. Id.
269. The trial court further stated in support of its ruling in favor of the county
residents, “[W]hen a major issue of importance to all citizens is being discussed at a
specially called meeting, the greatest notice available may be required.” Id. at *4.
270. See supra Part III.A.1.
271. See Zaid Jilani, Opponents of Tennessee Mosque Argue that Islam Isn’t a Religion
but Rather a Seditious Political Movement, THINK PROGRESS (Oct. 4, 2010, 3:46 PM),
https://thinkprogress.org/opponents-of-tennessee-mosque-argue-that-islam-isnt-a
-religion-but-rather-a-seditious-political-6da7bd1c9b97 [https://perma.cc/6JDD
-3822].
272. The RCRPC, which routinely granted hundreds of vetted site plans for religious and secular institution before the ICM’s, approved it on grounds of fitting within
the town’s zoning laws. Fisher, 2013 WL 2382300, at *1. A state court judge ultimately
invalidated that decision. Id. at *4 (“The trial court determined that the notice provided
by the county did not comply with the [Open Meetings Act].”).
273. By “movement,” the Author means broader popular resistance by means of
litigation, public protest, and even violence. This movement in Murfreesboro illustrates the enhanced coercive impact the facially discriminatory Tennessee anti-Sharia
law had on ICM’s opponents.
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violence when arsonists targeted the mosque five months after
RCRPC’s site plan approval.274
The popular covenant against the ICM mosque echoed the cornerstone ASM polemic that Islam was not a bona fide religion worthy
of First Amendment protection but rather a “legal-political-military
doctrine and system adhered to, or minimally advocated by, tens of
millions if not hundreds of millions of its followers around the
world.”275 The imprint of the ASM was evident in the assertions made
by the county residents’ lawyer who, in court, stated the following to
an RCRPC commissioner: “Are you aware that’s all the plaintiffs have
wanted from day one is to know whether this [proposed ICM mosque]
is a religious institution?” The lawyer then rhetorically asked: “Where
does tolerance meet Sharia law?”276
This view was advanced in court and in the community. At protests staged in front of the mosque, people shouted, “They are not a
religion. They are a political, militaristic group,” while others carried
signs reading, “No Sharia law for USA!”277 The ASM’s heuristic mission
violently unfolded at the doorstep of the Murfreesboro mosque.
The anti-ICM movement continued for two years after the RCRPC
approved the ICM’s land use request.278 Therefore, although the Commission voted in favor of the land use permit, the townspeople stifled
delivery of it through a restraining order procured by a state court,279
bolstered by continuous physical presence near the construction site

274. Fire at Tenn. Mosque Building Site Ruled Arson, CBS NEWS, https://www
.cbsnews.com/news/fire-at-tenn-mosque-building-site-ruled-arson [https://perma
.cc/CWN2-59M3] (Aug. 28, 2010, 9:25 PM).
275. S. 1028, 170th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2011). For a critical analysis of
the view that Islam is not a legitimate religion, see Asma T. Uddin, The Latest Attack on
Islam: It’s Not a Religion, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
09/26/opinion/islamophobia-muslim-religion-politics.html [https://perma.cc/TF5Z
-NU4Z].
276. Rachel Slajda, At TN Mosque Hearing, Plaintiffs Claim Islam Isn’t a Religion,
TALKING POINTS MEMO (Sept. 30, 2010, 9:30 AM), https://talkingpointsmemo.com/
muckraker/at-tn-mosque-hearing-plaintiffs-claim-islam-isn-t-a-religion [https://
perma.cc/5PS4-B4NH].
277. Far from Ground Zero, Opponents Fight New Mosques, CNY CENT. (Aug. 9,
2010), https://cnycentral.com/news/local/far-from-ground-zero-opponents-fight
-new-mosques [https://perma.cc/2WAN-LT66].
278. Fisher v. Rutherford Cnty. Reg’l Plan. Comm’n, No. M2012-01397-COA-R3-CV,
2013 WL 2382300, at *1–2 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 29, 2013) (“On September 16, 2010, a
group of county residents filed suit against the Rutherford County Regional Planning
Commission and numerous other county entities and officials . . . . The matter was tried
over two days in April 2012.”).
279. Id.
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and the looming threat of violence.280 The DOJ finally stepped in and
filed suit against Rutherford County, claiming that the state court’s restraining order violated RLUIPA.281 On July 18, 2012, a federal court
overrode the state court and mandated the county to “process the ICM
construction in a typical fashion,”282 finding that ICM’s religious exercise was substantially burdened and overtly discriminated against.283
Three weeks later, the ICM finally opened its new mosque doors
to the community during the holy month of Ramadan.284 The DOJ
RLUIPA suit ended a nearly twenty-seven-month-long popular covenant that prohibited the opening of the ICM mosque and denied
Murfreesboro’s Muslim residents the right to worship within the
mosque they had pooled their resources to build.285
B. AGAINST MUSLIM CEMETERIES
Islamic law has a distinct set of traditions with regard to interment.286 Burial rites include a thorough cleansing of the body and
shrouding it within a white linen cloth, followed by a burial and funeral.287 This all must be done within twenty-four hours of the decedent’s passing.288 The rapid growth of the Muslim American

280. Far from Ground Zero, supra note 277.
281. Fisher, 2013 WL 2382300, at *2.
282. Id.
283. United States v. Rutherford Cnty., No. 3:12-0737, 2012 WL 2930076, at *2
(M.D. Tenn. July 18, 2012).
284. The ICM was officially open to the public on August 10, 2012. Nancy De Gennaro, Murfreesboro Mosque Defaced with Graffiti, Bacon, USA TODAY (July 10, 2017, 5:58
PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2017/07/10/
murfreesboro-mosque-defaced-graffiti-bacon/466122001 [https://perma.cc/T7TJ
-URCS].
285. Violent opposition against the ICM continued long after it opened its doors. In
July 2017, the mosque was spray-painted with expletives and anti-Muslim messages
“spelled out with slices of bacon,” which Muslims consider sacrilege. See id.
286. See Islamic Funeral Etiquette, Traditions, Rites and More, BURIAL PLAN., https://
www.burialplanning.com/resources/religious-funerals-guide/islamic-funeral-guide
[https://perma.cc/84UD-E8UA].
287. This provides a general description of Islamic burial rites, although there is
some variance according to the difference in sectarian traditions and according to how
the decedent’s life was taken. For a more thorough analysis, see generally LEOR HALEVI,
MUHAMMAD’S GRAVE: DEATH RITES AND THE MAKING OF ISLAMIC SOCIETY (2007).
288. See id. For a more accessible analysis of the twenty-four-hour burial mandate,
see Rema Rahman, Who, What, Why: What Are the Burial Customs in Islam?, BBC NEWS
(Oct. 25, 2011), https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-15444275 [https://perma
.cc/4XVL-ZVLE].
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population, in metropolitan hubs and rural spaces beyond and in between,289 has increased demand for land where Muslims can be buried
in line with their religious rites.
This Section examines the ASM’s impact on land use disputes involving Muslim cemeteries within two distinct contexts.290 The first
case involves a dispute resolved in 2019 out of Farmersville, Texas, a
rural town that is home to a sparse but growing Muslim community.291
The second case is out of Castle Rock Township, Minnesota, a satellite
town of the Twin Cities home to one of the most sizable Black Muslim
populations in the United States.292
1. United States v. Farmersville
The Muslim population of Collin County, Texas, has grown by
nearly 400% in 19 years.293 In 2019, 23,000 residents in Collin County
identified as Muslim, up from only 6,000 in 2000.294 The exponential
growth of the Muslim population in northeastern Texas is tied to metropolitan Dallas’s status as an emerging hub of Muslim American
life.295 A destination for those seeking a vibrant spiritual and civic

289. In his landmark American Mosque study, Ihsan Bagby finds that the rural Muslim populations are not negligible in size. While “[t]he majority of mosques (53%) are
located in urban areas,” which are home to dense and sizable Muslim populations, rural areas, villages, and towns are home to one-fifth of all of the mosques in the United
States. These figures indicate that rural Muslims are not a transient population but
communities seeking to put down permanent roots, establish their lives and start families, and fuse observance of their faith with the rural American towns they have made
home. See IHSAN BAGBY, THE AMERICAN MOSQUE 2011: BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
AMERICAN MOSQUE ATTITUDES OF MOSQUE LEADERS 10 (2012).
290. For analysis of municipal opposition to a Muslim cemetery in Dudley, Massachusetts, see Christopher Cataldo, Discriminating Against the Dead: How To Protect
Muslim Cemeteries from Exclusionary Land Use Mechanisms, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1391, 1392–
96 (2017).
291. United States v. City of Farmersville, No. 4:19-cv-00285 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 16,
2019).
292. Al Maghfirah Cemetery Ass’n v. Castle Rock Twp., No. 19HA-CV-15-1839 (D.
Minn. Jan. 29, 2016).
293. Complaint at 5, City of Farmersville, No. 4:19-cv-00285 [hereinafter U.S. Complaint Against Farmersville].
294. Id.
295. The Dallas-Fort Worth area is home to fifty-five mosques, which evidences
the Muslim population’s size and institution-building achievements. See Amina Khan,
In an Irving Building, a Destination for Millennial Muslims, D MAG. (Oct. 30, 2018, 1:41
PM), https://www.dmagazine.com/frontburner/2018/10/roots-community-space
-irving-dallas-millennial-young-muslims [https://perma.cc/8DRM-XH28].
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community,296 Dallas has lured Muslims from across the country to
settle in the metropolitan area and neighboring Collin County.297
The rapid growth of the Muslim population in Collin County has
tasked community leaders to accommodate the spiritual needs of living Muslims and, more urgently, the recently departed.298 In 2013, the
two Muslim cemeteries in neighboring Denton County were near or
approaching capacity and “landlocked” by surrounding properties
that confined their expansion.299 In response to growing demand for
Islamic-compliant interment, the Islamic Association of Collin County
(IACC) began its search for a plot of land to develop the first Muslim
cemetery in Collin County in 2013.300 In the face of urgent burial requests from the community and strict state zoning laws,301 the IACC
finally identified and purchased a thirty-four-acre plot in the City of
Farmersville in early 2015.302 This predominantly white and Christian
town was located near the easternmost border of Collin County and,
at the time, had few Muslim residents and no mosques.303

296. Id.
297. Dallas is also home to a sizable, and rapidly growing, Latinx Muslim population. See Jobin Panicker, A Growing Number of DFW Hispanics Are Converting to Islam.
Here’s Why, WFAA (Apr. 23, 2019, 6:04 AM), https://www.wfaa.com/article/news/
local/a-growing-number-of-dfw-hispanics-are-converting-to-islam-heres-why/287
-8ae80c5c-6441-4fca-b00a-2a3ad83b3fa6 [https://perma.cc/7FQ7-XRKA].
298. U.S. Complaint Against Farmersville, supra note 293 (“In 2013, the Islamic Association held a summit with leaders from Collin County[] . . . [concluding that] the development of a local cemetery that provided affordable burials for Muslims in Collin
County was the top priority for the Muslim community.”).
299. Id.
The Muslim community in Collin County currently buries decedents in two
cemeteries—the Restland Cemetery in Dallas and a cemetery for Muslims in
Denton. Both of those cemeteries are nearly out of space. The Restland cemetery has only a few hundred gravesites left and is “landlocked” and therefore
has no room to expand. The Denton cemetery has gravesites for only a few
more years and cannot expand.
Id.
300. “The Islamic Association of Collin County is a non-profit organization formed
in 1997 to promote the religious interests of Muslims in Collin County and foster relations and understanding between Muslims and non-Muslims.” Id. at 4.
301. Texas state laws restrict the development of cemeteries within one mile of the
limits of a city with a population greater than 5,000 people, and within five miles of
cities with a population of 200,000 or more. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 711.008
(West 2019).
302. U.S. Complaint Against Farmersville, supra note 293, at 6–7.
303. Farmersville is “a predominantly white community of approximately 3,500
residents about 35 miles north-east of Dallas.” Proposed Muslim Cemetery Raises Concerns About ‘Radical Islam’ in Texas, GUARDIAN (July 19, 2015, 12:12 PM), https://
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The challenge of identifying land that could be purposed into a
cemetery paled in comparison to the opposition the IACC faced from
Farmersville’s civic leaders and residents. Mayor Joe Helmberger
made the Muslim cemetery the subject of his “State of the City” speech
in June 2015, which elevated the IACC’s planned cemetery into a matter of public concern.304 The town galvanized against the planned
cemetery in rapid order, and opponents of the Muslim cemetery
stormed the Collin County Planning Commission (CCPC) and Farmersville City Council (FCC) meetings before the land use matter was made
a matter of formal concern.305 At these meetings, public attendees
stated that the IACC was aiming to “change our laws to conform to
Sharia law” and that Islam is a “religion of hate and destruction.”306
The pronouncements echo, almost verbatim, the very fears propagated by the ASM and manifest the discursive force of the twenty-one
anti-Sharia bills introduced in Texas since 2010,307 the highest number in the country. In fact, the majority of these bills were brought before the Texas state legislature between 2010 and 2015,308 the span in
which the IACC emerged as the target of public opposition in Farmersville.
Standing-room-only town hall meetings followed.309 At a CCPC
meeting on August 4, 2015, prominent Farmersville pastor David

www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jul/19/muslim-cemetery-texas-farmersville
[https://perma.cc/8DW8-YU5D].
304. U.S. Complaint Against Farmersville, supra note 293, at 7. Helmberger stated,
“There’s just a basic concern or distrust about the cemetery coming into town,” voicing
the popular opposition that quickly mounted after his speech. Texas Residents Condemn Plan for Muslim Cemetery, CHI. TRIB. (July 19, 2015, 12:23 PM), https://www
.chicagotribune.com/nation-world/ct-texas-muslim-cemetery-20150719-story.html.
305. U.S. Complaint Against Farmersville, supra note 293, at 7.
306. Id.
307. Islamophobia: Overview of Bills, supra note 181.
308. Texas enacted its anti-Sharia statute in 2017, during the midst of the land use
dispute and DOJ litigation against Collin County. See H.R. 45, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex.
2017).
309. In Farmersville, Residents Sound Off About Plans for Muslim Cemetery, KERA
NEWS (Aug. 5, 2015, 1:01 PM) [hereinafter Farmersville Residents Sound Off], https://
www.keranews.org/post/farmersville-residents-sound-about-plans-muslim
-cemetery [https://perma.cc/277A-GEB8]. Some of these meetings, including a session on August 4, 2015, attracted audiences as large as 300 to 400 people—or roughly
10 to 13% of Farmersville’s entire population, which reflected the scale of popular opposition to the IACC’s planned cemetery. Randy R. Potts, Why Is Farmersville, Texas, So
Dead-Set Against a Muslim Cemetery?, DAILY BEAST (Aug. 5, 2015, 2:20 PM), https://
www.thedailybeast.com/why-is-farmersville-texas-so-dead-set-against-a-muslim
-cemetery [https://perma.cc/5NQR-S5W2].
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Meeks of Bethlehem Baptist Church spoke on behalf of the burgeoning
popular covenant against the Muslim cemetery, stating:
We have a real anxiousness about Islamic people, Muslim people coming
to Farmersville. We feel very uncomfortable with that. You just can’t trust
them. I don’t think they’ll tell the truth about this issue. I think eventually,
there will be a mosque. Eventually there will be a training center there.310

Echoing the ASM’s projected fears of “creeping Sharia,”311 Pastor
Meeks’s anxiety centered on the fear that the Muslim cemetery only
marked the beginning of an “Islamic takeover”;312 in short, it was the
tip of the Sharia iceberg that includes a “[terrorism] training center.”313 The zeal of this popular covenant reflected the resonance of
the ASM within the Texas state legislature and deeply impacted the
IACC hearing.
The standoff between the IACC and the people of Farmersville
continued for another four years. Members of the FCC and Diane
Piwko—who succeeded Helmberger as Farmersville’s mayor—
openly echoed the very anti-Muslim views of their constituents.314
Mayor Piwko also called the Halff engineering firm, which had concluded that the plot of land was suitable for a cemetery, “disloyal,”315
appealing to the ASM binary that oriented Islam—and thus the IACC—
as un-American.316 Immediately upon claiming office, Piwko fanned
the anti-Muslim sentiment in Farmersville,317 which turned its rage
squarely upon the IACC as the local embodiment of Sharia law.
The FCC unanimously voted against the IACC’s land use application on July 11, 2017,318 enforcing an aligned covenant against the
cemetery. The FCC formally cited “draining issues” and “flooding” concerns as the reasons for denial.319 However, the aligned covenant
310. Farmersville Residents Sound Off, supra note 309.
311. See Montopoli, supra note 98.
312. Id.
313. Farmersville Residents Sound Off, supra note 309.
314. Piwko’s mayoral campaign centered on her opposition to the IACC’s planned
mosque, dovetailing with (then-candidate) Donald Trump’s strategic deployment of
his proposal to “ban Muslims” as a cornerstone of his 2016 presidential bid. See U.S.
Complaint Against Farmersville, supra 293, at 9.
315. Id. at 10.
316. See ALAC Model Statute, supra note 152.
317. U.S. Complaint Against Farmersville, supra note 293, at 10. Mayor Piwko has
also stated publicly that her opposition to IACC’s cemetery is not about religion. Lauren
Silverman, Proposed Muslim Cemetery Rattles North Texas Town, NPR (July 25, 2015,
7:47 AM), https://www.npr.org/2015/07/25/426145892/proposed-muslim
-cemetery-rattles-north-texas-town [https://perma.cc/E2BC-A37T].
318. U.S. Complaint Against Farmersville, supra note 293, at 14.
319. Id.
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against the proposed cemetery (and its Muslim handlers), manifested
by explicit anti-Muslim pronouncements by residents and local government officials,320 revealed the FCC’s genuine motive. At a meeting
with the mayor, FCC members, and other city officials on August 3,
2017,321 officials “expressed concerns having nothing to do with purported drainage concerns, including the cemetery’s aesthetics, management, and long-term funding,” which bolstered the IACC’s belief
that anti-Muslim animus drove their land use denial.322 In what appeared to be an admission of religious discrimination, Mayor Piwko
stated, “[T]he [FCC] serves to implement the will of the citizens, and
so we have to be aware of what a majority of our citizens want.”323
Other city officials, including a voting councilmember who shared this
perspective, revealed that “political pressure” and “[fear of] losing
their jobs” motivated their opposition to the IACC’s land use request.324
Backed by mayoral and high-level city support, the FCC assented
to and endorsed the popular resistance to the construction of a Muslim cemetery. Two years after the land use denial by the FCC, the DOJ
filed a RLUIPA suit against the City of Farmersville.325 The suit claimed
that the land use denial discriminated against the IACC on religious
grounds and substantially burdened their exercise of religion.326 On
April 16, 2019, the City of Farmersville reached a settlement with the
DOJ, which mandated delivery of the land use permit to construct the
cemetery,327 in addition to requirements that the Council undergo
mandatory RLUIPA compliance training and education.328 While
RLUIPA enforcement will bring the Muslim cemetery into existence, it
did not bury the ASM’s stout influence in the Texas town.

320. Id. at 7.
321. The city manager, city engineer, and city attorney were also present at the
meeting. Id. at 15.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 16.
324. Id. As observed by one commentator writing about land use discrimination
against a Muslim cemetery in Dudley, Massachusetts, “local officials in charge of overseeing the community’s land use mechanisms are politicians; they are not isolated
from the public through long-term appointments, but instead face frequent elections.”
Cataldo, supra note 290, at 1406.
325. U.S. Complaint Against Farmersville, supra note 293, at 1.
326. Id. at 18–19 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)–(b)(2)).
327. Settlement Agreement at 6, United States v. City of Farmersville, No. 4:19-CV00285 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2019) [hereinafter Farmersville Settlement].
328. Id. at 7.
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2. Al Maghfirah v. Castle Rock Township
Castle Rock Township, a small town forty miles south of Minneapolis, seemed like a natural location for a Muslim cemetery. After all,
Minnesota is home to the largest Somali population in the United
States, a Black immigrant community that has elevated the Twin Cities
into a symbolic and demographic capital of Muslim American life.329
At approximately 58,000 Somali residents and rising,330 the demand
for Muslim cemeteries has grown alongside the Somali and broader
Muslim population in Minnesota.
The call for more Islamic burial sites pushed community leadership to search for suitable property to establish a new Muslim cemetery.331 In February 2014, the Al Maghfirah Cemetery Association (Al
Maghfirah) identified an approximately seventy-three-acre property
in Castle Rock Township and, immediately upon purchase, submitted
an application to the Castle Rock Township Planning Commission
(CRTPC) to use the plot of land as a site for a cemetery.332 The township’s ordinances “explicitly stated that land included in the district
[where the purchased property is located] could be conditionally used
as a cemetery.”333 The planned cemetery would meet the local needs
of Muslims in the township and Dakota County, and it would also absorb overflow burials from the near-capacity cemeteries in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area.334
329. See Maya Rao, How Did the Twin Cities Become a Hub for Somali Immigrants?,
STAR TRIB. (June 21, 2019, 10:45 AM), http://www.startribune.com/how-did-the-twin
-cities-become-a-hub-for-somali-immigrants/510139341 [https://perma.cc/89CY
-KLY6] (“[Minnesota] has . . . the largest concentration of Somalis in America.” (citing
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY (2017))); see also Immigration and
Language, MINN. ST. DEMOGRAPHIC CTR., https://mn.gov/admin/demography/data-by
-topic/immigration-language [https://perma.cc/4V2T-VQKZ] (“In 2018, the largest
groups of foreign-born Minnesotans were born in . . . Somalia (33,500) . . . . These estimates do not include U.S.-born children of these immigrants.” (citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY (2018))).
330. There were 58,800 Minnesotans that reported Somali ancestry in 2018. Immigration and Language, supra note 329 (citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY (2018)).
331. See generally Al Maghfirah Cemetery Ass’n v. Castle Rock Twp., No. 19HA-CV15-1839 (D. Minn. Jan. 29, 2016) (summarizing Al Maghfirah Cemetery Association’s
efforts to establish a Muslim cemetery in Castle Rock Township).
332. Id. The planned cemetery would also have a funeral home on its premises. Id.
at 4.
333. Id. at 3.
334. See generally Castle Rock Township Planning Commission Public Hearing, Conditional Use Permit For 1120 220th St. W, CASTLE ROCK TWP. (May 27, 2014) [hereinafter
Castle Rock May 27th Meeting], https://www.castlerocktownship.com/pdf/5-27-14_
Public_Hearing_Minutes-Cemetery_CUP.pdf [https://perma.cc/GJE8-8JDN].
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Three months after the purchase, the CRTPC met to review Al Maghfirah’s application for a conditional use permit to establish its cemetery.335 In light of the township’s explicit inclusion of cemeteries as
part of its zoning plan,336 the Muslim nonprofit believed this would be
an administrative formality and a conditional use permit would be issued expeditiously.337 However, the Castle Rock Township Board
(Board) voiced instant opposition to Al Maghfirah’s permit request,
with one supervisor asking, “Why are they looking for an additional
cemetery? The Burnsville Cemetery is still open for expansion, so I
don’t understand why they want to establish another one here.”338
Another supervisor stated, “I am opposed to having a cemetery in
this location,”339 despite the township’s zoning ordinance’s explicit inclusion of cemeteries340 and Al Maghfirah representative Hyder Aziz
testifying that the Roseville and Burnsville cemeteries are “filling
up,”341 creating need for an additional burial site. The CRTPC hearing
ended without a final ruling.342 This hearing signaled the creation of a
guised public covenant against Al Maghfirah’s plans to build a cemetery.
In June 2014, the CRTPC unanimously recommended that the
Board approve Al Maghfirah’s petition.343 However, four of the five
Board members voted in favor of denial.344 Their stated reasons for
ruling against Al Maghfirah’s petition included a diminished tax
335. Id.
336. Al Maghfirah, slip op. at 3.
337. See Jessie Van Berkel, Activists Call for Federal Investigation of Castle Rock
Township’s Denial of Islamic Cemetery, STAR TRIB. (Nov. 3, 2015, 8:31 AM), http://www
.startribune.com/activists-call-for-federal-investigation-of-castle-rock-township-s
-denial-of-islamic-cemetery/339674762 [https://perma.cc/55W4-3WW3] (quoting
“Hyder Aziz, a member of Al Maghfirah Cemetery Association . . . ‘They said this application is perfectly fine,’ Aziz said, then the board rejected it. ‘I don’t know what’s going
on, but something is not right.’”).
338. Castle Rock May 27th Meeting, supra note 334, at 3 (statement of Commissioner Tammy Salmon).
339. Id. (statement of Commissioner Erv Zimmer).
340. Al Maghfirah, slip op. at 3.
341. Castle Rock May 27th Meeting, supra note 334, at 3.
342. Id. at 5.
343. Emma Nelson, Dakota County Judge Rules in Favor of Islamic Cemetery, STAR
TRIB. (Feb. 1, 2016, 9:11 PM), http://www.startribune.com/dakota-county-judge
-rules-in-favor-of-islamic-cemetery/367222941 [https://perma.cc/C5Z7-LACS].
344. “A favorable Board vote is needed to enforce the Commission ruling; the only
Board vote not registered against Al Maghfirah’s petition belonged to David Nicolai,
who did not attend the hearing.” Castle Rock Township Board of Supervisors Regular
Meeting, CASTLE ROCK TWP. (Aug. 11, 2014), https://www.castlerocktownship.com/
pdf/8-11-14%20BOS%20meeting%20minutes.pdf [https://perma.cc/3KDF-QW9Y].
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base,345 it being “discriminatory” for not being “open to the public for
burials,”346 and an unsubstantiated decree that “[t]here is no need for
more land to be made into cemeteries in the state of Minnesota,”347
despite Aziz’s testimony about other Muslim cemeteries in the greater
area nearing capacity.348
No evidence about the suitability of the soil or impact on the tax
base was presented at the hearing.349 Six weeks after denying their
land use petition, the Board rejected Al Maghfirah’s appeal request.350
In response to the land dispute, the Board “approved several amendments to the township [zoning] ordinances, including removing cemeteries as a conditional use” on January 12, 2015.351 This regulatory
amendment sought to kill Al Maghfirah’s attempt to establish a Muslim cemetery in Castle Rock Township, once and for all.
Prior to the RLUIPA investigation commenced by the DOJ in November 2015,352 Al Maghfirah filed a claim against Castle Rock Township in Dakota County court.353 Judge Knutson ruled in favor of the
plaintiffs, writing, “[The Board’s] decision to deny the [conditional use
permit] was arbitrary and capricious,”354 and he ordered the defendant to provide Al Maghfirah with the permit to establish the cemetery.355 The court cited the Board’s non-transparency with the plaintiff, lack of evidence about the detrimental tax implication with the

345. “Russ Zellmer stated that the parcel is over 70 acres, which is extraordinarily
large for a cemetery. He feels this is a lot of tax base which will be lost to the Township.”
Id.
346. Id. (statement of Board member Russ Zellmer).
347. Id. (statement of Board member Sandy Weber, relaying a message delivered
to her by the executive director of the Minnesota Association of Cemeteries).
348. Castle Rock May 27th Meeting, supra note 334, at 3.
349. Al Maghfirah Cemetery Ass’n v. Castle Rock Twp., No. 19HA-CV-15-1839, slip
op. at 5 (D. Minn. Jan. 29, 2016).
350. Id.
351. Id.
352. The Minnesota chapter of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)
prompted the DOJ to investigate this matter in November 2015, which was ongoing by
the time Al Maghfirah sued in state court. Nelson, supra note 343; see also Van Berkel,
supra note 337 (examining the role of activists in pushing for the DOJ investigation).
353. Al Maghfirah, slip op. at 6 (“Plaintiff filed a civil Complaint in this case on May
8, 2015 requesting a declaratory judgment by the Court finding that Defendant’s decision to deny the CUP application was arbitrary and capricious and further requesting
a writ of mandamus requiring that Defendants issue the requested CUP for the subject
property.”).
354. Id. at 10.
355. Id. at 13.
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cemetery, and the speculative financial consequences cited by several
Board members to rule against Al Maghfirah.356
The ongoing RLUIPA investigation, and the possibility of a federal
suit against Castle Rock Township,357 activated Al Maghfirah toward
legal action. In fact, RLUIPA galvanized the support of activists and local media attention that encouraged Al Maghfirah to file suit—highlighting RLUIPA’s “soft” enforcement power.358 The DOJ continued its
investigation during and after the state court ruling, monitoring
whether the state court would order the Board to deliver the conditional use permit.359 In the instance of a negative outcome, it is highly
likely that the DOJ would have exercised its right to bring a RLUIPA
action against Castle Rock Township. Or, in line with its proactive decision to file suit in state court, Al Maghfirah may have filed a RLUIPA
claim in federal court before the DOJ. However, the state court ruling
and its delivery of the permit secured the eventual opening of the Al
Maghfirah cemetery by the spring of 2017,360 while the DOJ continues
to monitor the Castle Rock Township Board for discriminatory behavior.
***
Al Maghfirah is a telling case study for how the geographic location of a Muslim land use request impacts the municipal response and
the course of litigation. Unlike Farmersville, where the IACC was seeking to build a cemetery less than half the size of the cemetery in Castle
Rock Township,361 Al Maghfirah did not face the explicit municipal
discrimination or the popular covenant Muslims in Collin County confronted. Rather, as illustrated by the concerns the Castle Rock
356. Id. at 10–12.
357. Nelson, supra note 343.
358. Here, the Author uses “soft” power to explain the de facto effects spurred by
RLUIPA, distinguished from its delineated “hard” enforcement powers. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc–2(f).
359. Nelson, supra note 343 (“In November, CAIR-MN and other Islamic community leaders asked the U.S. Department of Justice to investigate whether the board’s
denial of the application represented discrimination against Muslims. That investigation is continuing.”).
360. Accord New Islamic Cemetery in Rural Dakota County Is Vandalized, TWIN CITIES PIONEER PRESS (Aug. 1, 2017, 7:39 PM), https://www.twincities.com/2017/08/01/
islamic-cemetery-in-suburban-minneapolis-is-vandalized [https://perma.cc/QN2T
-2K4E]. Opposition to the cemetery continued after it opened. The very element that
latently influenced the Board’s petition rose to the surface in late July 2017, when the
cemetery walls were spray-painted with swastikas and profanities. Id.
361. The Farmersville cemetery sat atop thirty-four acres. U.S. Complaint Against
Farmersville, supra note 293, at 12. By contrast, the Al Maghfirah cemetery would be
built on seventy-three acres of land. Nelson, supra note 343.
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Township Board used as pretexts for religious discrimination,362 Al
Maghfirah and the Minnesota Muslim community they represented
were burdened with navigating the latent discriminatory terrain of a
blue state.
While hardly free of anti-Muslim animus, as manifested by the
three anti-Sharia bills introduced by Minnesota state legislators,363
the less pronounced impact of the ASM in Minnesota, and the Castle
Rock Township Board, the proposed cemetery did not incite the popular opposition that unfolded in Farmersville, Texas. Rather, the
Board’s opposition to the Muslim cemetery was subtle and veiled by
neutral pretexts.364 These two Muslim cemetery cases, which rise
from two radically different political and geographic contexts, illustrate why Al Maghfirah was able to sue in state court without the
threat of popular retribution. This proactive step was not advisable to
their Muslim counterparts in Farmersville, whose land use request
summoned the explicit angst of the townspeople, its politicians, and
planning commissions. If they had sued in state court, the specter of
violence attached to the popular covenant may have endangered them
and the small Muslim community living in Collin County.
C. AGAINST MUSLIM SCHOOLS
Pittsfield Township is forty-five miles west of Detroit, a metropolitan area home to a constellation of the country’s most concentrated Muslim communities.365 The town is also home to the new site
of the Michigan Islamic Academy (MIA), a “full-time Islamic School,
pre-kindergarten through Grade 12,”366 previously located in
362. Al Maghfirah, slip op. at 10.
363. Islamophobia: Overview of Bills, supra note 181.
364. The use of discriminatory pretexts, most notably noise, traffic, and tax concerns, are commonly cited to oppose the construction of mosques. For a recent case
involving the planned construction of an Islamic center in a Kansas City suburb, opposed by popular covenant citing these discriminatory pretexts, see Katy Bergen, Huge
Islamic Center Planned for South Overland Park. Neighbors Aren’t Happy, KAN. CITY STAR
(Mar. 11, 2019, 8:34 PM), https://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/
article227329904.html.
365. See Sarah Parvini, Trump’s Travel Ban Motivated Muslims To Participate in Politics. Now, They’re Eyeing Local Office, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www
.latimes.com/politics/story/2020-09-08/la-na-muslim-voters-presidential-election
[https://perma.cc/GA8P-3YAB] (discussing the large Muslim population in Detroit
and surrounding areas).
366. United States v. Pittsfield Charter Twp., No. 2:15-cv-13779, slip op. at 2 (E.D.
Mich. Oct. 14, 2016). The DOJ noted how land use requests for Muslim schools, like the
MIA, “are particularly vulnerable to discriminatory zoning actions taken by local officials, often under community pressure.” 2016 DOJ RLUIPA REPORT, supra note 15, at 4.
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neighboring Ann Arbor. In order to accommodate its growing student
body,367 an MIA affiliate purchased a plot of land on September 8,
2010, with plans to make it the site of a new state-of-the-art facility.368
A rezoning request needed to accommodate the MIA was filed
with the Township at the time of purchase.369 In fact, the MIA affiliate
who secured the land met with the Pittsfield Township supervisor before purchase, who “invited the idea” of purposing the land for a Muslim school.370 However, on August 4, 2011, the Pittsfield Township
Planning Commission (PTPC) voted to deny the MIA’s rezoning petition.371 Two months later, the Township’s Board of Trustees (Board)
confirmed the decision.372
The MIA’s land use request, however, fit within the parameters of
the Township’s zoning plan.373 The general development plan for the
area permitted “small-scale churches” and “small-scale schools,”374
and the MIA contended that its intended building fit within the latter
category.375 After relying on the Township supervisor’s representation that a school could be built on the property before purchase, and
uncovering that the city’s master development plan permitted the
construction of small schools in the area in question,376 MIA began to
sense that religious discrimination was at play. Its representatives believed that “hostility toward Islam” swayed the Board’s determination,377 fueled by animus toward Michigan’s sizable Muslim population and the four anti-Sharia bills introduced in its state legislature.378

367. “We have very limited resources here, we’re next to the mosque, and we’ve
been searching for a place to expand to be in a school that would fit the 21st century,”
stated MIA board member Tarek Nahlawi. Tom Perkins, Michigan Islamic Academy Officials Make Case for New Pittsfield Township School, ANN ARBOR NEWS (Mar. 31, 2011,
4:40 PM), http://www.annarbor.com/news/michigan-islamic-academy-officials
-make-case-for-new-pittsfield-township-school [https://perma.cc/M6FE-4948].
368. Pittsfield, slip op. at 2. In June 2015, the purchaser of the property (Said Issa)
conveyed five of the approximately twenty-seven acres to MIA to build a school. Id. at
2–3.
369. Muslim Cmty. Ass’n of Ann Arbor v. Pittsfield Charter Twp., No. 12-CV-10803,
2015 WL 1286813, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 20, 2015).
370. Id.
371. Id. at *5.
372. Id.
373. Id. at *2.
374. Id.
375. Id. at *3.
376. Id.
377. Id. at *1.
378. Islamophobia: Overview of Bills, supra note 181.
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Events that took place at the PTPC hearings on June 16, 2011, and
August 4, 2011, bolstered the MIA’s claim of religious discrimination.379 At the initial meeting, a resident of Pittsfield Township sitting
in the audience stood up and shouted, “[I] would just wish that everyone in this room could have pledged allegiance to the flag of the United
States of America,”380 calling into question the patriotism of MIA’s representatives on grounds of their Muslim identity.381 The statement
was followed by applause from the large group of residents attending
the hearing, with members of the audience staring in the direction of
the MIA’s representatives while clapping.382 In response, the PTPC
chairperson declared, “[Neither] Islam nor the character of the Michigan Islamic Academy is on trial here.”383 However, several members
of the audience and commissioners seated alongside the chairperson—it was later revealed—were poised to oppose MIA’s land use request on grounds of its religious character. At the following hearing in
August, the PTPC denied the MIA land use request by a 3-2 vote,384
with the June session setting the anti-Muslim tone that marred the administrative process.
Popular opposition to the Muslim land use request displayed at
the June hearing was not limited to the residents of Pittsfield Township. In fact, the popular resistance was orchestrated from within.
Deborah Williams, a PTPC commissioner who voted against the MIA’s
land use request,385 assumed the role of internal ringleader. Williams
made her home in the neighborhood where the MIA planned to build
its new school, and she actively lobbied her neighbors to attend the
379. Muslim Cmty. Ass’n of Ann Arbor, 2015 WL 1286813, at *4.
380. Id.
381. See Karen Engle, Constructing Good Aliens and Good Citizens: Legitimizing the
War on Terror(ism), 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 59 (2004) (analyzing how War on Terror narratives cast Muslim identity as presumptively alien and subversive and place the added
burden on Muslims to demonstrate allegiance to the nation by way of performances of
patriotism (placing a flag in front of their home or standing for the Pledge of Allegiance)).
382. Muslim Cmty. Ass’n of Ann Arbor, 2015 WL 1286813, at *4. The crowd at the
subsequent PTPC hearing was larger and more raucous, with “[a]bout 125 residents
attend[ing] and about 50” who spoke during the public comment portion of the proceeding. Tom Perkins, Islamic School Rezoning Rejected by Pittsfield Township Planning
Commission, ANN ARBOR NEWS (Aug. 5, 2011, 5:59 AM), http://www.annarbor.com/
news/pittsfield-township-planning-commission-recommends-rejection-of-rezoning
-for-islamic-academy [https://perma.cc/N7BH-GEVC].
383. Muslim Cmty. Ass’n of Ann Arbor, 2015 WL 1286813, at *4.
384. Id. at *5 (noting that the PTPC’s official justification for denying the rezoning
request was that the MIA was not a small-scale school, and therefore, outside of the
parameters of the city’s general development plan).
385. Id.
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PTPC hearings and voice their opposition.386 In fact, preventing the
construction of the MIA in Pittsfield Township became Williams’s personal crusade:
[Williams] was vehemently opposed to MIA’s petition, so much so that she
took it upon herself to both inform community members about MIA’s petition
and actively encourage them to oppose it. Williams admitted in her deposition that she went from house to house in February 2011 [four months before
the first PTPC hearing addressing MIA’s petition], “knock[ing] on doors,” distributing to residents living near the site of MIA’s proposed school a letter
opposing MIA’s petition.387

Beyond this initial phase of organizing Pittsfield Township’s public to oppose MIA’s planned school, Williams emailed residents and
even “coached community members on how to effectively oppose the
petition by sharing specific talking points and arguments.”388 Her objective, well before the PTPC could assess MIA’s petition, was to orchestrate popular opposition among the Township’s intimate community and mobilize the very hostility that unfolded at the June 16, 2011,
hearing.
In short, Williams capitalized on her Board seat with the PTPC to
cultivate a popular covenant against the school. At the hearing, Williams cloaked her discriminatory intent by citing pretexts such as a
diminished tax base and the spike in traffic the MIA would cause in the
Silverleaf neighborhood where she made her home and where the
new school would be built.389
Facing this religious hostility stoked from within local government, MIA filed a RLUIPA claim on February 22, 2012.390 The DOJ followed suit, filing a separate cause of action on October 26, 2015.391 In
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. The DOJ alleged that Williams “‘actively organized residents to oppose MIA’s
petition, including by instructing them regarding what objections to raise.’ By which
we take to mean: Talk about the traffic, the landscaping, the height, the noise, anything
but the fact that this is a Muslim school.” Michael Jackman, An Expensive Education:
Pittsfield Twp. Must Allow Islamic School, Pay $1.7 Million, METRO TIMES (Oct. 3, 2016,
1:35 PM), https://www.metrotimes.com/news-hits/archives/2016/10/03/an
-expensive-education-pittsfield-twp-must-allow-islamic-school-pay-17-million.
390. Muslim Cmty. Ass’n of Ann Arbor, 2015 WL 1286813, at *6. The MIA settled
with Pittsfield Township on September 29, 2016, for $1.7 million, concluding its
RLUIPA claim. See Talal Ansari, This Town Has To Pay an Islamic School 1.7 Million After
Denying Its Zoning Rights, BUZZFEED NEWS (Sept. 29, 2019, 5:35 PM), https://www
.buzzfeednews.com/article/talalansari/town-to-pay-an-islamic-school-17-million
[https://perma.cc/FJB7-EDDB].
391. United States v. Pittsfield Charter Twp., No. 2:15-cv-13779, slip op. at 1 (E.D.
Mich. Oct. 14, 2016).
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addition to the federal court ordering the rezoning that would allow
the MIA to finally build its school, the Township was compelled to undergo federal RLUIPA training and to actively maintain, monitor, and
keep records of subsequent land use applications.392 This relief not
only resolves the MIA’s land use dispute but also deters future Muslim
land use applicants in the Michigan town from the prospect of facing
the same religious discrimination.
IV. RESTORING RIGHTS AND RETRENCHING RAGE
In a letter to a friend, Mark Twain wrote, “If we only had some
God in the country’s laws, instead of being in such a sweat to get him
into the Constitution, it would be better all around.”393 Twain’s words
speak to the enduring compulsion of municipal actors, many of whom
fashion themselves guardians of culture, to inject religion into the affairs of the state. This is duly evidenced by the ASM’s projection of
anti-Muslim views onto city boards and planning commissions, which
drive the land use denials and staunch refusals to settle disputes with
Muslim parties seeking to establish mosques, Muslim cemeteries, and
Islamic schools. In response, RLUIPA has extended a buffer to Muslim
populations in the form of deterring religious discrimination on the
part of local governments. And, as the cases examined above demonstrate, RLUIPA has delivered settlements and court orders that extend
bridges toward building the Muslim institutions preempted by discriminatory land use denials.
RLUIPA’s protection of Muslim religious freedom extends beyond
its statutory land use scope. First, the creation of mosques and schools
has collateral free exercise implications, particularly in towns where
they never existed before, providing vital forums where Muslims collectively engage in free exercise, assembly, and speech activity. Second, the measures imposed on local governments as part of a RLUIPA
settlement or court order, including mandated monitoring and storage of all records and RLUIPA training and education, limits the antiMuslim animus rooted by the ASM within municipal boards and planning commissions.
A. RESTORING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
RLUIPA has met the increased discrimination against Muslim
land use petitions since 2010 with a robust response and proven
392. Id. at 6–10.
393. Letter from Mark Twain to William Dean Howells (Sept. 18, 1875), in 1 MARK
TWAIN’S LETTERS 261, 262 (Albert Bigelow Paine ed., 1917).
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results. This federal vindication of Muslim land use claims has pushed
mosques, Muslim cemeteries, and Islamic schools into existence, and
it consequently has empowered the collective enjoyment of First
Amendment activity within these religious spaces and outside of their
walls.
This Section analyzes the collective and collateral religious rights
enabled by RLUIPA and the transformative impact the statute’s enforcement has in radically transforming Muslim life in locales where
Muslim institutions have never existed.
1. Activating Collective Rights
Muslim identity is active. It obliges responsibilities rooted in distinct spiritual belief394 and mandates participation in activity that is
central to being a member of the faith community.395 As Sudeall Lucas
observes,
One aspect of religious identity is participating in holidays and rituals associated with a given religion. Thus, religious identity is different from other
types of identity in that it may require engagement in certain actions or practices. This is why it is critical to religious identity that a member of a given
religion be able to engage in such actions under the protections provided by
the Free Exercise Clause.396

While engagement in spiritual or communal activities is mandated by religion,397 the opportunity to engage in (and the scope of)
394. For a sociological study examining the formation of Muslim identity within
the United States, see generally Lori Peek, Becoming Muslim: The Development of a Religious Identity, 66 SOCIO. RELIGION 215 (2005).
395. In addition to the distinctly spiritual obligations tied to Muslim identity, political stigma assigned to outward expression of Muslim identity can compel additional
modes of political performances. These stigmas, emitted by the ASM and other stimuli,
cause Muslims to negotiate their religious expression and performances in ways that
stave off suspicion or violence. For example, a devout Muslim woman who may choose
to remove her headscarf to minimize the prospect of animus or attack “covers” her
Muslim identity by uncovering. For a theoretical framing followed by a practical analysis of this phenomenon, see generally Khaled A. Beydoun, Acting Muslim, 53 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2018).
396. Sudeall Lucas, supra note 84, at 69.
397. In Smith, Justice Scalia wrote that being part of a religion is not only limited to
belief, “but the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts: assembling with others for a worship service, participating in sacramental use of bread and wine.” Emp.
Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990); see Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166
(1878) (outlining the jurisprudential distinction between religious belief and religious
action and holding that the state can regulate the latter but not the former, here, criminalizing the practice of polygamy); see also United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86–
88 (1944) (holding that courts are restricted from assessing the veracity of religious
beliefs but, in line with Reynolds, maintaining that actions tied to those beliefs may be
regulated).

2021]

ON SACRED LAND

1867

free exercise activity is contingent upon the availability of religious
spaces.
Members of most faith communities, including Islam, require the
land and space to worship together, commune, and engage in the various traditions that activate religion into more than just private belief.
The lack of religious spaces not only circumscribes a Muslim’s religious expression but limits the opportunity to engage in additional
forms of expression, assembly, speech, and “performative” religious
activity.398 The importance of private religious spaces where Muslims
can express their “genuine [religious] selves” is especially vital during
a moment of intensifying anti-Muslim animus,399 when public expressions of conspicuous Muslim identity are often met with suspicion
from the state and private actors.400
RLUIPA enforcement creates vital inroads toward enabling these
performative expressions of Muslim identity. By overriding local government denials of land use permits, RLUIPA has facilitated the establishment of the very spaces and centers where Muslim religious expression is activated and expanded.401 Mosques—not unlike other
houses of worship—are where belief transforms from a private and
introspective affair into a dynamic and collective enterprise. The most
quintessential example of this is Islamic prayer, which is typically a
family act when performed at home.402 But within the confines of a
mosque, it evolves into a dynamic and synchronized ritual that brings
together Muslims of various races and ethnicities, age groups and
wealth classes.403 As a result, prayer takes on a more multi398. Here, the Author uses “performative” in line with Goffman’s framing of being
able to outwardly express religious identity in line with one’s “genuine self” (and
against societal stigma). ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE
229 (1959).
399. Law scholar Daniel O. Conkle writes that religion and religious community
“form a central part of a person’s belief structure, his inner self. They define a person’s
very being—his sense of who he is, why he exists, and how he should relate to the
world around him.” Daniel O. Conkle, Toward a General Theory of the Establishment
Clause, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 1113, 1164 (1988); see also Christopher C. Lund, Religion Is
Special Enough, 103 VA. L. REV. 481, 523 (2017) (arguing that religious liberty is deserving of constitutional protection).
400. Beydoun, supra note 395, at 1.
401. Sudeall Lucas, supra note 84, at 69.
402. Practices in Islam, BBC, https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/zhnhsrd/
revision/4 [https://perma.cc/XZW4-TLLA].
403. Islam generally encourages its adherents to pray as a collective, particularly
on “Jummah,” or Friday prayer, the faith’s holy day. See Muhammad Jawad Mughniyya,
Prayer (Salat), According to the Five Islamic Schools of Law, AL-ISLAM.ORG, https://
www.al-islam.org/prayer-salat-according-five-islamic-schools-law-sheikh
-muhammad-jawad-mughniyya/salat-al-jamaah [https://perma.cc/57AK-NPA4].
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dimensional meaning within the mosque context, spawning social and
civic possibilities that would not come into being if confined to the
household.404
However, mosques are more than just houses of worship. They
are also engines of intellectual, social, and civic life for Muslim communities.405 They provide gathering spaces where Muslims listen to
spiritual sermons and learn from guest lecturers,406 hold language
classes, house youth groups, host book talks, and convene public gatherings to address timely political concerns.407 The mosque is, oftentimes, the lifeline of the Muslim community and a space that secular
Muslims also rely upon for social and civic engagement.408
Furthermore, scholars have also argued that mosques in nonMuslim majority states are central to the educational and social engagement of Muslim women in particular,409 while studies have detailed the mosque’s function in stimulating volunteerism and philanthropic engagement.410 Therefore, beyond prayer and spiritual
404. This is especially true for mosques that welcome Sunni and Shia Muslims, and
individuals of every race, ethnicity, and socioeconomic status, to congregate under one
mosque roof. See, e.g., ISLAMIC INST. MINN., https://www.islamicinstituteofmn.com
[https://perma.cc/JR6M-CL5H] (“The Islamic Institute of Minnesot [sic]- IIM is a nonprofit religious corporation serving Muslims in the State of Minnesota and surrounding
areas regardless of color or place of origin. IIM emphasizes the value of diversity.”).
405. “From the earliest days of Islam, the mosque was the centre of the Muslim
community, a place for prayer, meditation, religious instruction, political discussion,
and a school.” SALAH ZAIMECHE, FOUND. FOR SCI. TECH. & CIVILISATION, EDUCATION IN ISLAM:
THE ROLE OF THE MOSQUE 3 (Salim Al-Hassani & Talip Alp eds., 2002).
406. To cite examples of non-religious educational events routinely held within
mosques, the author spoke at thirteen mosques across the country while promoting
his book, BEYDOUN, supra note 153, in addition to other houses of worships, including
churches and synagogues.
407. This activity is flattened by the ASM, particularly strident anti-Sharia bills like
the version enacted in Tennessee, which spurs popular or civic classification of
mosques as “Sharia organizations” tied to terrorism. S. 1028, 170th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (Tenn. 2011).
408. Therefore, in addition to its inherent spiritual function, American mosques
also have deeply secular functions that benefit non-practicing Muslims and non-Muslims. This highlights the (often neglected) non-spiritual dimensions of mosques in the
United States. See Inside the Mosque: What Do You Need To Know?, BBC, https://www
.bbc.co.uk/teach/inside-the-mosque-what-do-you-need-to-know/zr3f2sg [https://
perma.cc/D4S5-E4YH] (“The mosque is a place to gather for prayers, to study and to
celebrate festivals such as Ramadan. It can also be used to house schools and community centres.”).
409. See Marivi Pérez Mateo, The Mosque as an Educational Space: Muslim Women
and Religious Authority in 21st-Century Spain, 10 RELIGIONS 222 (2019) (examining the
mosque’s centrality to the spiritual and social engagement of Muslim women in Spain).
410. See generally INST. FOR SOC. POL’Y & UNDERSTANDING, AMERICAN MUSLIM PHILANTHROPY: A DATA DRIVEN COMPARATIVE PROFILE (2019) (assessing the causes spurring the
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activity, mosques provide the essential spaces that enable and expand
the First Amendment speech and assembly rights rooted in religious
engagement,411 particularly in locales where Muslims are sparsely
populated.
For example, the absence of a bona fide mosque in Culpeper
forced the town’s Muslims to pray in a small house without an adequate washroom on the lot of a car dealership.412 The DOJ challenge of
the County Commission’s land use denial, which resulted in settlement ordering delivery of the land use permit,413 will enable the small
Virginia town’s Muslim community to hold regular daily and Friday
prayer services, hire a full-time imam,414 and convene programming
that enhances the spiritual and social life of the community. The DOJ
RLUIPA claim, therefore, not only helped bring the brick-and-mortar
mosque into existence but also activates meaningful assembly and exchanges, educational engagement, and the robust Muslim life that will
unfold within the mosque and the small Virginia town at large.
The creation of Muslim schools also spurs collateral rights for
Muslim communities. The MIA’s expanded and modern facility in
Pittsfield Township, Michigan, provides secular and religious academics. Religious instruction entwines religious liberty with the substantive due process rights of parents, as observed by the Supreme
Court.415 More narrowly, the right of parents to enlist their children in
Muslims schools is a natural emanation of religious freedom, which
enables them to rear their children in line with their religious beliefs
and worldview.416

recent increase in Muslim philanthropy and the mosque’s central role in stimulating
it).
411. “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
412. U.S. Culpeper Complaint, supra note 231, at 4–5.
413. United States v. Cnty. of Culpeper, No. 3:16-cv-00083, 2017 WL 3835601, at
*1 (W.D. Va. Sept. 1, 2017).
414. The spiritual leader of a mosque, who is in charge of leading prayer and guiding the institution and community (Arabic). See Beliefs and Practices, BBC, https://
www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/zvm96v4/revision/8 [https://perma.cc/DW4N
-FEPJ] (“The term ‘imam’ means ‘in the front’ and this person simply leads the prayers—they are no better than anyone else as everyone is equal in the eyes of Allah. Often, an imam will teach Arabic and they act as the khatib—the person to preach the
Friday sermon.”).
415. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925) (establishing that the
substantive due process rights of parents to guide the education of their children is a
fundamental right).
416. Id. at 518–19.
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Furthermore, the MIA’s expanded facility broadens the scope of
that collective right by allowing more parents to enroll their children
at the school, in turn making education steeped in Islamic values more
readily available to southeastern Michigan’s sizable Muslim population. As the MIA school case illustrates along with the cases analyzed
in Part III of this Article, Muslim land use matters involve not just the
right to build religious institutions—but also the broad scope of religious and non-religious activity that unfolds within them.
2. Transforming Muslim Life
“Our [new] mosque gives us everything,” shared Hassan, “a place
to teach our children, enjoy Ramadan together, and learn [how] to respect ourselves.”417 Hassan and his family of four have called Culpeper
home since 2013.418 His testimony—sharing the trials of not having a
real community mosque and having to pray inside an unheated building during unbearably cold winter days and nights—conjures imagery
of secret observances of a faith criminalized by an authoritarian regime.419 However, Hassan does not live in Xinjiang, China;420 he lives
in Virginia, the tenth state to join the Union421 and home to Thomas
Jefferson, who owned his own copy of the Qur’an.422
The nearly completed new mosque423 will create unprecedented
opportunities for Hassan and Muslims in Culpeper. Among them are
plans of a youth academy, a permanent imam and mosque board, interfaith sessions, and educational programs for the town’s Muslim
417. Interview with Hassan, Member of the Culpeper, Va., Muslim Cmty. (Sept. 3,
2019) (name changed to protect subject’s identity).
418. Id.
419. See Sigal Samuel, China Is Treating Islam Like a Mental Illness, ATLANTIC (Aug.
28, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/08/china
-pathologizing-uighur-muslims-mental-illness/568525 [https://perma.cc/Q5U2
-5YFV], for a leading exposé of China’s mass internment of Uighur Muslims and its violent crackdown on Muslim life in the disputed Xinjiang province.
420. Id.
421. See MARGO J. ANDERSON, THE AMERICAN CENSUS: A SOCIAL HISTORY 280–81 (2d ed.
2015).
422. DENISE A. SPELLBERG, THOMAS JEFFERSON’S QUR’AN, ISLAM AND THE FOUNDERS 3
(2013) (“[Jefferson’s] engagement with the [Muslim] faith began with the purchase of
a Qur’an eleven years before he wrote the Declaration of Independence.”).
423. See Emily Jennings, Culpeper Mosque Construction Nearly Complete, CULPEPER
STAR-EXPONENT (Apr. 22, 2020), https://starexponent.com/news/culpeper-mosque
-construction-nearly-complete/article_9e03d194-cb6a-5a47-869d-4779aeea3b3d
.html [https://perma.cc/AJZ8-NDH5] (explaining the Islamic Center of Culpeper president Mohammad Nawabe hopes to open the mosque to the community soon); see also
About Us, ISLAMIC CTR. CULPEPER, https://islamiccenterofculpeper.org/about-us
[https://perma.cc/Q57M-MRLF] (explaining the mosque “is nearly done”).
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families.424 None of these opportunities existed while the community
prayed in a makeshift prayer room.425 The new mosque will radically
change Muslim life in the small town by offering a central community
space that enables regular spiritual and civic assembly, a private space
to engage in unencumbered speech, and educational programs for
youth and adults.
This transformative effect on Muslim life in Culpeper would likely
not have been possible without RLUIPA enforcement. First, the facts
of the Culpeper case would have presented challenges for the Muslim
petitioners’ argument that the county engaged in facial discrimination. Therefore, petitioners’ First Amendment free exercise claim may
have been dismissed or subjected to only rational basis review. Second, by federalizing their claim of religious discrimination, RLUIPA
took petitioners’ claim from the state court and into federal court, imposing upon the ICC the lower burden of proving a substantial burden
on religious grounds.426
While the Smith regime could have been fatal,427 RLUIPA enforcement proved fruitful. Consequently, the DOJ’s RLUIPA enforcement effort overrode a discriminatory local government and extended the
needed septic permit to the ICC,428 allowing the ICC to establish Culpeper County’s first mosque, which—unlike the vacant building the
town’s Muslims once prayed in—is far more than just a prayer room
but an institution where religious expression and a myriad of other
First Amendment liberties vibrantly take form. RLUIPA enforcement
did more than just enable Culpeper’s Muslims to establish their first
mosque; it provided the very lifeline for a burgeoning Muslim community.
In addition to revitalizing Muslim life in towns where land use
discrimination rendered religious expression dormant, RLUIPA enforcement has enabled decedent Muslims to be buried in line with
their Muslim rites, now and into the future.429 Prior to RLUIPA
424. Interview with Hassan, supra note 417.
425. See U.S. Culpeper Complaint, supra note 231, at 4–6.
426. See United States v. Cnty. of Culpeper, No. 3:16-cv-00083, 2017 WL 3835601,
at *2 (W.D. Va. Sept. 1, 2017).
427. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
428. See Press Release, Muslim Advocs., The Islamic Center of Culpeper Settles Religious Land Use Lawsuit (Apr. 21, 2017), https://muslimadvocates.org/2017/04/the
-islamic-center-of-culpeper-settles-religious-land-use-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/
QZ25-T3DL].
429. The threshold meaning of “decency” for observing Muslims includes a burial
that aligns with religious custom. See generally Mir Ubaid, What Is a Muslim Funeral
Like in New York?, AL JAZEERA (Mar. 7, 2016), https://www.aljazeera.com/features/
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enforcement, land use discrimination against Muslim cemeteries denied and deprived Muslims of their dignity within an enterprise where
the law has traditionally extended care and concern: death and interment.430
Denying Muslims the right to be buried in line with their rites
strips them and their loved ones of religious dignity. In her formative
work Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration, property law scholar
Bernadette Atuahene defines a “dignity taking” as seizure of property
that “occurs when a state directly or indirectly destroys or confiscates
property rights from owners or occupiers and the intentional or unintentional outcome is dehumanization or infantilization.”431 Recently,
the Supreme Court emphasized the salience of dignity (and dignity denials) to core constitutional rights, most famously illustrated in Justice
Anthony Kennedy’s majority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges, which
positioned marriage equality as a fundamental due process right.432
Like same-sex couples wishing their marriages would be
acknowledged by the state and society at large, Muslims seeking to establish cemeteries for their loved ones also “ask for equal dignity in
the eyes of the law,”433 seeking to recover dignity denied to them, and
preemptively taken,434 by discriminatory land use decisions in Farmersville, Texas, and Castle Rock Township, Minnesota. In Farmersville,
the Islamic Association of Collin County (IACC) purchased a plot of
land and filed for a land use permit in early 2015.435 For four years,
the city’s discriminatory ruling denied the IACC, and the broader

2016/3/7/what-is-a-muslim-funeral-like-in-new-york [https://perma.cc/P7YL
-PPKF].
430. See 4 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 524 (15th ed. 2020) (“At
common law, it is a nuisance to fail to provide a decent burial for a person to whom the
defendant owes such a duty.”).
431. Bernadette Atuahene, Dignity Takings and Dignity Restoration: Creating a New
Theoretical Framework for Understanding Involuntary Property Loss and the Remedies
Required, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 796, 817 (2016). Atuahene defines dehumanization as
“the failure to recognize an individual’s or group’s humanity.” Id. at 801.
432. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (“There is dignity in the
bond between two men or two women who seek to marry and in their autonomy to
make such profound choices.”).
433. Id. at 2608.
434. The Author broadens Atuahene’s socio-legal concept “dignity taking” by including a preemptive discriminatory denial of a complaint’s land use petition. See Atuahene, supra note 431, at 817–18 (outlining Atuahene’s definition of “dignity taking”).
435. See U.S. Complaint Against Farmersville, supra note 293, at 6.
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Muslim community in Collin County, access to a cemetery that aligned
with local zoning parameters.436
A similar scenario took place in Minnesota. In Al Maghfirah, a
Muslim nonprofit purchased a plot of land in Castle Rock Township in
2014, which the Township’s Planning Commission initially ruled was
in compliance with local zoning law.437 However, the Township
Board’s later permit denial prolonged the opening of the cemetery until the spring of 2017.438 Consequently, many Muslims in Minnesota
were denied the right to bury their loved ones in line with their religious customs for more than three years. Many compromised their religious beliefs and buried loves ones in mixed cemeteries.439 These delays and compromises stripped Muslims in Castle Rock Township of
the dignity one should expect during the mourning process and denied the departed the dignity of being buried in line with their religious rites.
Again, as examined above, land use denials are not only injurious
to the applicant, but they are also harmful to the broader community
that seeks to engage with or benefit from the institution. Therefore,
the Farmersville and Al Maghfirah cemetery cases involve “community
dignity takings,”440 which prevented Muslims in northeastern
Texas441 and Minnesota from being able to bury their loved ones for
four and three years, respectively.442 The right to bury loved ones
within zoning-compliant cemeteries was delivered by RLUIPA as the
chief vehicle for change in Farmersville and Castle Rock Township.

436. A settlement was finally reached between the DOJ and the City of Farmersville
on April 16, 2019, which included delivery of the permit to the IACC to build the cemetery. See Farmersville Settlement, supra note 327, at 4–6.
437. Nelson, supra note 343.
438. See Farmersville Settlement, supra note 327, at 2.
439. See Death Related Issues, AL-ISLAM.ORG, https://www.al-islam.org/a-code-of
-practice-for-muslims-in-the-west-ayatullah-sistani/death-related-issues [https://
perma.cc/F7C3-7HZH] (“It is not permissible to bury a deceased Muslim in the graveyard of non-Muslims.”).
440. Cf. Jamila Jefferson-Jones, “Community Dignity Takings”: Dehumanization and
Infantilization of Communities Resulting from the War on Drugs, 66 U. KAN. L. REV. 993
(2018) (applying the community dignity taking framing to collective forms of punishment resulting from the War on Drugs).
441. This discrimination likely includes Muslims in bordering Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Louisiana, who have few or no Muslim cemeteries within their bounds.
442. Likewise, given the metropolitan Twin Cities’ proximity to Wisconsin and
Iowa, which have few Muslim cemeteries, harm extends to Muslim residents in Wisconsin and Iowa who may have sought to bury their loved ones at the Al Maghfirah
Cemetery in Castle Rock Township.
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This change occurred by way of a DOJ settlement in the former443 and
a DOJ investigation inspired by an independent lawsuit in the latter.444
RLUIPA “affirmed” the religious dignity of the Muslim communities in
Farmersville and Castle Rock Township445 and restored the dignity of
the family members and friends who would be put to rest in those pioneer cemeteries in different parts of the country.
B. RETRENCHING RAGE
Free exercise of religion incursions are typically rooted in institutionalized animus or aversion.446 This phenomenon, which is the
very focus of this Article, highlights the intimate connection between
the free exercise and establishment clauses and, specifically, how
RLUIPA’s de facto mission to disentangle anti-Muslim animus seeded
by the ASM operates alongside the Act’s statutory mission to protect
Muslim land use claimants against the ASM’s projective effect on local
governments.
Through settlement and court order relief, RLUIPA mandates municipal governments to maintain records, volunteer for federal monitoring, and engage in anti-discrimination trainings. This Section analyzes: first, the retrenchment effect these modes of relief have on the
institutionalization of anti-Muslim attitudes; second, how proposals
to expand the scope of RLUIPA trainings combat municipal animus
against multiple faith groups; and third, the efficacy of an appeal for
coordinated establishment clause strategies by Muslim and LGBTQ
populations—who are both primary targets of culture wars, which
mobilize municipal actors to leverage religious freedom as a sword of
discrimination.447

443. Farmersville Settlement, supra note 327.
444. Al Maghfirah Cemetery Ass’n v. Castle Rock Twp., No. 19HA-CV-15-1839, slip
op. at 10 (D. Minn. Jan. 28, 2016).
445. Cf. Jamila Jefferson-Jones, Extending “Dignity Takings”: Re-Conceptualizing the
Damage Caused by Criminal History and Ex-Offender Status, 62 ST. LOUIS L.J. 863, 868–
70 (2018) (articulating “dignity restoration” as the product of state or private action
that restores one’s ability to engage in activity that sustains or enhances individual or
collective dignity).
446. See supra Part II.
447. Religious freedom laws, like RLUIPA and RFRA, are intended to serve as
shields against religious discrimination. Yet, the more expansive interpretation of the
latter statute, and the copycat state legislation it inspired, has been wielded as an offensive tool to discriminate. See, e.g., Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140 (3d
Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020).
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1. Disestablishing Municipal Animus
The ASM’s projective effect on local governments, from a sequence perspective, is first an establishment clause concern.448 Before
its messages are deployed by way of land use denials to discriminate
against Muslim claimants and the broader communities they represent, anti-Sharia ideas and images must first be absorbed and “entangled” with the administration of land use determinations.449 The degree of municipal entanglement with the ASM’s condemnation of
Islam varies in shape and appearance, as illustrated in the cases examined above.450 However, the entrenchment of anti-Sharia narratives,
or what Sudeall Lucas dubs “projective religious identity claims,”451 in
each of the five cases suggest encroachment on the establishment
clause.
There is, perhaps, no area of modern doctrine that is as fractured
as establishment clause jurisprudence. Many First Amendment scholars contend that none of the standing judicial tests offer a compelling
articulation of establishment clause infringement,452 and constitutional law scholar Eric Segall aptly observes the “great deal of confusion” among “the lower courts, and the Justices of the Supreme Court
over appropriate establishment clause principles.”453 While a unifying
theory does not exist, two standing tests—the “Lemon test” and the
“endorsement test”—offer useful doctrinal frameworks to examine

448. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (declaring the government “shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion”).
449. The Author is applying the “Lemon test,” which holds that a governmental action (1) must have a secular purpose, (2) “its principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion,” and (3) must avoid causing “excessive government entanglement with religion.” Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13
(1971).
450. The ASM does not necessarily impose one religious worldview onto local governments but projects the castigation of Islam and casts rigid suspicion onto its core
religious practices.
451. Sudeall Lucas examines the establishment clause ramifications of projective
religious identity, arguing that “a prohibition on projective religious identity claims
would be in alignment with the Establishment Clause, as the Clause is opposed to the
promotion or projection of one religious identity such that it infringes on the religious
identities of others or obstructs others from exercising their legal rights.” Sudeall Lucas, supra note 84, at 105–06.
452. See KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 433–51 (2008) (summarizing scholarship critical of the Court’s establishment clause jurisprudence).
453. Eric J. Segall, Mired in the Marsh: Legislative Prayers, Moments of Silence, and
the Establishment Clause, 63 U. MIA. L. REV. 713, 724 (2009).
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how RLUIPA relief counters the ASM’s entrenchment within municipal land use administration.454
The facts in Farmersville illustrate both municipal entanglement
and “endorsement” of anti-Muslim views.455 Again, the city council’s
unanimous vote against the IACC’s (zoning law compliant) permit to
build a Muslim cemetery in Farmersville was assenting to the popular
opposition of residents, who explicitly derided the Islamic faith and
openly voiced their collective “anxiousness about Islamic people [or]
Muslim people coming to Farmersville.”456 Councilmembers admitted
that mounting “political pressure” from the townspeople and fear of
“losing their jobs” pushed them to capitulate to the popular anti-Muslim rage and vote to deny the IACC’s request.457 This admission is a
quintessential example of religious endorsement and unequal treatment enforced through a regulatory decision driven by “disapproval”
of the IACC’s Muslim faith.458
With regard to the Lemon test, the Farmersville Council’s denial
was hardly secular and was driven pointedly by the ASM’s objective of
“inhibit[ing]” the creation of a Muslim cemetery in the city.459 Furthermore, beyond the ultimate decision being sealed by religious animus,
the Farmersville Council’s entire administrative process was “entangle[d]” with the anti-Muslim lobbying by the townspeople460 and was
influenced by the anti-Sharia messages found in legislation introduced
in Texas that year.461 In Farmersville, the Council’s sole reason for
denying the land use permit was a religious one, and specifically an
454. These two tests, while widely critiqued, are the tests most commonly used by
the courts to examine an establishment clause question. This Article does not engage
with the “coercion test,” adopted by the Supreme Court in Lee v. Weisman, given that
test’s focus on youth and, specifically, “protecting freedom of conscience from subtle
coercive pressure in the elementary and secondary public schools.” 505 U.S. 577, 592
(1992). Justice Sandra Day O’Connor introduced the “endorsement test” in a concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
A majority of the Court adopted the test five years later in County of Allegheny v. ACLU,
492 U.S. 573, 595–97 (1989).
455. The endorsement test invalidates governmental action if “a reasonable observer would view such longstanding practices as a disapproval of his or her religious
choices.” Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 631 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
456. Farmersville Residents Sound Off, supra note 309 (quoting a popular pastor
who shared these words at the city council hearing).
457. U.S. Complaint Against Farmersville, supra note 293, at 16.
458. See Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 631 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing the
endorsement test).
459. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
460. See id. at 613.
461. See Shanmugasundaram, supra note 166.
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anti-religious one. This consequently rendered the Council’s administration of the IACC’s land use request in conflict with the establishment clause according to Lemon test analysis.
The settlement agreement reached between the United States
and Farmersville illustrates the DOJ’s commitment to limit the institutionalization of anti-Muslim animus within the Council. First, the DOJ
recognized that the land use dispute encompassed far more than a
plot of land and one aggrieved party. The IACC’s religious exercise
concerns were resolved by the DOJ’s settlement agreement, which
mandated delivery of the permit to build the cemetery.462 Second,
looking past resolving the specific harm tied to the land use denial, the
DOJ settlement mandated that
within ninety (90) days of the Effective Date of this Agreement, it will provide
training on the requirements of RLUIPA to persons that have responsibilities
relating to the enactment, implementation and enforcement of the City’s zoning or land use regulations.463

This RLUIPA training, in effect, is punitive and rehabilitative.464
First, swift assignment of RLUIPA training is a functional judgment by
the DOJ that the municipal body has endorsed anti-Muslim views or
its land use determinations are firmly entangled with them.465 Second,
the training provides the DOJ with the ability to coordinate programming that (seeks to) disentangle anti-Muslim views from municipal
land use administration and disestablish projective anti-Sharia stimuli within the city council.466 The training has a sustained effect beyond a mandated course, or courses, of instruction; it also placed the
Farmersville Council on the DOJ’s ongoing RLUIPA radar, thus deterring the prospect of future violations.
In addition to mandated trainings, RLUIPA relief also includes inspection and monitoring of municipal records as possible remedies.467
These remedies enable the DOJ to assess the degree of municipal
462. Farmersville Settlement, supra note 327.
463. Id. at 7.
464. The training is also injunctive because it seeks to cease anti-Muslim state action on the part of the city, within and beyond the land use context.
465. The order in Pittsfield also mandated that the planning commission and Board
undergo RLUIPA training. See United States v. Pittsfield Charter Twp., No. 2:15-cv13779, slip op. at 6–7 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 14, 2016).
466. In comparison, the RLUIPA training ordered in United States v. Township of
Bernards, a case involving a land use denial of a mosque, was more stringent than the
remedy in Pittsfield. See Settlement Agreement at 9–11, United States v. Twp. of Bernards, No. 16-CV-08700 (D.N.J. May 30, 2017). It required the mayor, consultants and
contractors of the Township, planning board, and zoning board of adjustments to first
sign a contract of RLUIPA compliance, and then attend a RLUIPA training. Id.
467. See, e.g., id. at 11–13.
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entanglement with anti-Muslim sentiment through close scrutiny of
land use records, which is particularly salient in cases where the discrimination was subtle or disguised by pretext. This was the case in
Pittsfield, where private actors manifested an explicit animus toward
the MIA and its plans to build a school, while Board members enforced
that animus by way of campaigning against the school in their private
lives.468 Inspection and monitoring of records enables the DOJ to uncover the sources, motives, and context surrounding a land use denial
advanced under covert discriminatory motives.469 It then allows the
DOJ to subsequently gauge if additional RLUIPA trainings or other DOJ
interventions are needed to counter the municipal entrenchment of
anti-Muslim animus.
These modes of RLUIPA relief speak directly to establishment
clause infringement, both in relation to the land disputes in question
and prospective causes of action. In addition to the injunctive, punitive, and rehabilitative effect that RLUIPA trainings, record inspection,
monitoring, and public notice have on a municipal body in remedying
the direct injury,470 these interventions also provide a presumption of
anti-Muslim animus in future matters where the local government is
alleged to have engaged in a RLUIPA, free exercise of religion, or establishment clause violation. Therefore, RLUIPA’s mission of disestablishing anti-Muslim animus is achieved in the short-term by remedy
and carried forward in the long-term by establishing a record of municipal compliance (or non-compliance) that provides an evidentiary
basis for future free exercise, establishment clause, or RLUIPA challenges.

468. Specifically, Board member Williams organized residents and coached them
on how to voice their opposition to the school. See supra Part III.C. Williams transformed her post on the Board into a vehicle to campaign against the MIA and, more
broadly, the Muslim faith it represents. This transformation of a municipal post illustrates intimate entanglement with anti-Muslim views for the purpose of inhibiting a
Muslim school. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). In line with endorsement test analysis, “a reasonable observer would view” Williams’s actions as
rooted in anti-Sharia sentiment. Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 631 (1989)
(O’Connor, J., concurring).
469. See Pittsfield, slip op. at 9–13.
470. Public notice remedies include the placement of signage on the buildings of
governments that violated RLUIPA (“[T]he Township shall post and maintain printed
signs regarding their obligations under RLUIPA”); placement of an Internet posting of
municipal obligations to adhere to RLUIPA moving forward “on the first page of its
Internet home page”; and a commitment to non-discriminatory treatment of future
land use applicants on religious grounds. Id. at 4–5.
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2. Building Forward
The municipal entanglement of anti-Muslim sentiment and action
examined above, although directly sourced by the ASM, is also tied to
other forms of religious discrimination. As articulated at the outset of
this Article, the ASM is a strand of a broader culture war that singles
out Muslims, Jews, Buddhists, and Hindus as members of “un-American” faith traditions. This religious discrimination is violently manifested by attacks on Sikh gurdwaras and Jewish synagogues471 and the
rising land use discrimination against these and other minority faith
groups seeking to build religious institutions.472
In response to the disproportionate threat faced by minority faith
groups, RLUIPA relief has centered on constraining hostility along religious lines. The broader culture war that inspires the ASM also
drives anti-Semitism, which has accounted for eleven of the DOJ’s
RLUIPA land dispute investigations since 2010. RLUIPA relief, particularly trainings mandated by settlement or court order, extends opportunities for the DOJ to counter the source that gives rise to multiple
forms of religious animus and to seriously limit the myriad forms of
religious animus rooted in municipal bodies.
As a member of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, the Author has
proposed the creation of cross-community RLUIPA trainings. Namely,
these convening trainings would speak to the experiences of minority
religious groups across spiritual lines. Currently, RLUIPA trainings focus on instructing local government employees about the statute’s
provisions and enforcement mechanisms, offering a one-size-fits-all
presentation that responds to an individual land use dispute. While
this manner of RLUIPA training may be effective in deterring municipal discrimination against the faith group that prompted training, it
may have limited effect on deterring overall animus or discrimination.
With an eye toward maximizing the retrenchment effect of RLUIPA
trainings and expanding those who would benefit from it, the Author
proposes the following additions.473

471. This was most tragically illustrated by the mass shooting in Squirrel Hill on
October 27, 2018, when a shooter entered the Tree of Life Synagogue in the Pittsburgh
suburb and killed eleven people. 11 Dead, Several Others Shot at Pittsburgh Synagogue,
CBS PITT. (Oct. 27, 2018, 11:41 PM), https://pittsburgh.cbslocal.com/2018/10/27/
heavy-police-presence-near-synagogue-in-squirrel-hill.
472. 2016 DOJ RLUIPA REPORT, supra note 15, at 3–6.
473. The Author has formally proposed this plan as a sitting member of the Michigan State Committee of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission.
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First, the DOJ could propose RLUIPA trainings to municipal
boards or planning commissions during the investigatory stage.474
This proactive use of the training mechanism could be used to incentivize the local government to settle with the Muslim claimant before
litigation. Avoiding litigation would protect Muslim communities—
particularly those subjected to zealous popular covenants—from the
possibility of violence that litigation invites.475 In addition, avoiding
litigation would also prevent the media coverage that comes along
with it and feeds into ASM’s heuristic and discursive plans.476 Finally,
if the city is receptive to a pre-litigation RLUIPA training, it could expedite reaching a settlement and, thus, expedite the creation of the intended mosque, Muslim cemetery, or school.
Second, the author proposes a “close to home presentation” be
integrated into RLUIPA trainings to ensure training content focuses
closely on local fronts of religious bigotry. Specifically, this presentation would identify political actors or movements that have pointedly
anti-Semitic, anti-Muslim, racist, or bigoted mandates. In turn, this
would localize the character of RLUIPA training and single out its effect on actors sitting on city boards and planning commissions. This
forward-looking addition would put municipal actors on notice and
isolate those on city boards and planning commissions sympathetic to
discriminatory views. In addition, it could prompt cooperation among
Muslim, Jewish, and other religious minority groups in the area, which
is especially critical in remote and rural locales where their respective
populations are small and sparse.477
Third, instead of abstractly discussing the importance of religious
pluralism and tolerance, the DOJ should consult with academics or
scholars of religion to help design RLUIPA trainings.478 The DOJ can
coordinate panels where scholars of faith groups disproportionately
targeted in that town or city counter prevailing tropes or damaging
474. Instead of deploying the training as a post-litigation remedy, the DOJ can extend it as a tool toward settlement without litigation.
475. See Anti-Muslim Activities in the United States 2012–2015, NEW AM., https://
www.newamerica.org/in-depth/anti-muslim-activity [https://perma.cc/9SL2-2JLR].
476. See, e.g., Islamic Cemetery Vandalized in Rural Dakota Co., MPR NEWS (Aug. 1,
2017), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2017/08/01/islamic-cemetery-in
-suburban-minneapolis-vandalized [https://perma.cc/M59D-NMCN].
477. The Author, in his capacity as an Equality Fellow, has convened several interfaith sessions with local governments centered on RLUIPA training and education, including in states where the ASM and anti-Semitism are particularly threatening.
478. Although theoretically appealing, consulting with local faith leaders to be part
of RLUIPA trainings would run the DOJ afoul of the establishment clause. See supra Part
IV.B.1.
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political messaging. To forge lasting bridges and minimize costs, the
DOJ should seek academics or scholars from nearby universities or
colleges. A cross-religious panel would identify the various fronts of
religious bigotry that threaten minority faith communities and, in line
with the spirit of the establishment clause, erode distinct strands of
religious bigotry enmeshed with local government.479
These three revisions would enhance the positive impact of
RLUIPA trainings on the front- and back-end of land use disputes. In
addition, these revisions push the DOJ to frame religious bigotry as a
broader, interconnected phenomenon that may manifest itself in the
form of civic opposition to a mosque in a town today but could mobilize into a protest against the creation of a Sikh temple or synagogue
tomorrow. This change would turn RLUIPA trainings into proactive
instruments for sustained change and diminish the institutionalization of religious animus vertically and horizontally.
3. Finding Common Ground
This Article interrogates rising land use discrimination faced by
Muslims. However, the legal territory this Article investigates is the
space between the promise of expressive freedom and civic denial.
Muslims, certainly, do not find themselves alone on these trying
grounds. As examined above, other minority faith groups are denied
access to land as a consequence of their spiritual beliefs. However, the
scope of victims harmed by religious animus is not limited to minority
faith groups; religious animus also drives discrimination against racial
and sexual minority groups. Although crafted by Congress to shield
against religious discrimination, private and civic actors have wielded
religious freedom statutes as swords to inflict harm on groups they
deem as sacrilegious and uncivilized.480
479. See generally Jeffrey H. Goldfien, Thou Shalt Love Thy Neighbor: RLUIPA and
the Mediation of Religious Land Use Disputes, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 435 (arguing for a mediation-based approach to RLUIPA claims where parties establish common ground and
common language to ensure the parties gain a deeper understanding of the other’s religious beliefs and arguments, and then work to obtain an agreeable outcome).
480. See Tom Gjelten, How the Fight for Religious Freedom Has Fallen Victim to the
Culture Wars, NPR (May 23, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/05/23/
724135760/how-the-fight-for-religious-freedom-has-fallen-victim-to-the-culture
-wars [https://perma.cc/7PY4-ET5T]; Emily London & Maggie Siddiqui, Religious Liberty Should Do No Harm, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 11, 2019, 9:03 AM), https://www
.americanprogress.org/issues/religion/reports/2019/04/11/468041/religious
-liberty-no-harm [https://perma.cc/39FZ-PQKL]; Ian Thompson, In an Era of Religious
Refusals, the Do No Harm Act Is an Essential Safeguard, ACLU (Feb. 28, 2019, 11:15 AM),
https://www.aclu.org/blog/religious-liberty/using-religion-discriminate/era
-religious-refusals-do-no-harm-act-essential [https://perma.cc/5FCU-V785].
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Framing the projective impact of the ASM as an establishment
clause concern enables strategic coordination with LGBTQ scholars
and advocates. While much of the legal scholarship examining how
federal religious protection statutes—especially RFRA and state (or
“mini”) RFRAs481—fixate on the use of religious freedom as a tool to
deny services and rights to LGBTQ communities, the very politico-religious fronts that castigate Islam are simultaneously invested in condemning sexual minorities. By shifting the analytical prism from the
free exercise to the establishment clause and exposing how movements such as the ASM and the “Religious Right” enmesh their views
within local government,482 members of the Muslim and LGBTQ communities can align and coordinate strategic actions to safeguard, and
promote, their respective interests.
Local government is more susceptible to the projective influence
of politico-religious movements. While sexuality law scholars have examined how religious entanglement has resulted in the denial of civic
services to LGBTQ communities, this Article illustrates the ASM’s influence over city boards and planning commissions.483 Law scholar
Kyle Velte dubs this phenomenon the emergence of “quasi-theocratic
zones,”484 whereby municipal actors’ determinations are driven by
projective views that deny public and private services to sexual minorities on account of their religious beliefs and reject land use permits to Muslims on the basis of the same beliefs. Therefore, the bureaucratic entrenchment of this religious animus erodes the rights of
both Muslim and LGBTQ communities.
This kindred victimization should prompt coordinated action.485
This action, if forged through an establishment clause theory, enables
481. For an analysis of “mini” RFRAs, see Christopher C. Lund, Religious Liberty After Gonzales: A Look at State RFRAs, 55 S.D. L. REV. 466 (2010).
482. This Article adopts this (broadly used) term to encompass the numerous
Christian political groups that seek to inject conservative religious values into government policy.
483. The majority of this scholarship interrogates RFRA and the copycat RFRA
statutes states adopted after the Supreme Court’s ruling in City of Boerne. See generally
Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience
Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516 (2015), for a leading analysis of how
religious exemption bars third-parties, including members of LGBTQ communities,
from accessing equal services from public and private actors.
484. See Kyle C. Velte, All Fall Down: A Comprehensive Approach to Defeating the
Religious Right’s Challenges to Antidiscrimination Statutes, 49 CONN. L. REV. 1 (2016).
485. As an Equality Fellow, the Author has held workshops within more than
twenty mosques across the United States, pushing Muslim communities to work
closely with LGBTQ leadership on a range of civil rights fronts, including the land and
property contexts.
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the protection of religious exercise for Muslims while confronting the
institutional homophobia that denies sexual minorities access to services. Echoing law scholar Berta Esperanza Hernandez Truyol, “I am
as concerned with Muslims having the right to build mosques as I am
with sexual minorities to not experience discrimination for who they
are.”486 Using the establishment clause to attack this common source
of homophobic and anti-Muslim animus could erode the religious (and
anti-religious) stronghold within local governments that actively discriminates against Muslims and sexual minorities.
Disestablishing the religious roots of homophobia and anti-Muslim animus within local government should be a common objective,
and indeed, one that should push Muslim leadership to overcome their
own biases against sexual minorities, who are likewise condemned by
cultural movements that assail their humanity and deny their dignity.487 Muslim civic and religious organizations have been slow to
forge strategic relationships with LGBTQ groups, but as the Author
has observed, acknowledging the existence of LGBTQ Muslims on both
sides of the divide is a prerequisite for finding common ground and
fostering solidarity:
Queer people of Islamic heritage have often been erased, by both allies
and enemies, homophobes and homophiles: those who rightly fight against
Islamophobia [within the land use context] have not always been aware or
inclusive of the many LGBT individuals in their midst, and the LGBT mainstream and its allies have not always condemned xenophobic Islamophobia,
and have in certain cases contributed to it.488

Indeed, disentangling homophobia within mosques and Muslim
organizations and retrenching anti-Muslim sentiment from LGBTQ institutions are prerequisites for building a common front against
movements that cast both groups as unworthy of equality. To challenge institutionalized homophobia within Muslim spaces, the Author
has convened private community discussions within mosques addressing the concerns of LGBTQ Muslims and, on two occasions, mediated discussions between them and mosque leadership.489 Although
a small step, interventions like these are essential for progress within
the broader Muslim community and will dictate the possibility for
486. Khaled A. Beydoun, Panelist, LatCrit Biennial Conference at Georgia State University Law School: Religious Rights and Restraints (Oct. 19, 2019).
487. See BEYDOUN, supra note 153, at 183–87.
488. Khaled A. Beydoun & Mehammed A. Mack, The Hate Behind the Orlando Massacre, AL JAZEERA (June 13, 2016), https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2016/6/13/
the-hate-behind-the-orlando-massacre [https://perma.cc/CC2G-KRLU].
489. In his capacity as an Equality Fellow, the Author mediated two private sessions between LGBTQ Muslims and Islamic clergy in Detroit, Michigan, and Miami,
Florida.
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coordination with LGBTQ communities against cultural fronts that demonize the two.
While establishment clause attacks against these collectives offer
the possibility of rights redemption beyond the land use realm, collective resistance and sustained solidarity—among minority faith groups
and Muslims and LGBTQ communities—extends the greatest hope for
repressing their projective influence within local governments across
the country.
CONCLUSION
Beware the ridiculous. It will one day rule you.
−Steven Dietz, God’s Country490
[O]ur civil rights have no dependence on our religious opinions . . . .
−Thomas Jefferson (1779)491

Land is sacred. It was tended to faithfully by the indigenous nations who first lived atop American soil.492 It remains sacred today,
especially for minority faith groups interlocked between emboldened
popular hostility and the projective effect such hostility has on municipal bodies presiding over the fate of their cemeteries and synagogues,
schools and temples.
Keying in on the Muslim experience since 2010, this Article investigates the challenging terrain Muslim land use claimants occupy—between municipal enforcement of law that seeks to deny their religious
freedom and federal legislation that aims to restore it. This terrain has
become even more precarious since the rise of the ASM in 2010 and
its imprint on the land use determinations conducted by city boards
and planning commissions across the country. Enacted in 2000,
RLUIPA’s value to Muslim land use requests climaxed when it confronted the ASM in 2010. The Act also challenged the ASM’s projective
impact on local governments in rural towns, where no Muslim institution had ever been established, and on urban fronts, where Islam is an
established part of the religious landscape.

490. STEVEN DIETZ, GOD’S COUNTRY 95 (2010).
491. See 82. A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, 18 June 1779, NAT’L ARCHIVES:
FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-02-02
-0132-0004-0082 [https://perma.cc/F5S4-NDRA].
492. See Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 589 (1823) (establishing the principle
that indigenous peoples’ dominion over North American territory could be extinguished by force and legally supplanted by European colonial claim).
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For Muslims enduring one of the most ungodly fronts of today’s
culture wars, RLUIPA has given life to the very Muslim institutions local governments were invested in preempting. Through examination
of case law, this Article highlights the impact of religious bigotry
within local governments, which govern the fate of minority faith communities, and RLUIPA’s role in protecting them. In the coming decade,
when the public covenants of rage will be inflamed by mounting culture wars that intensify divisions along lines of race and religion, sect
and sexual orientation, RLUIPA’s capacity to combat hate within local
government may be more vital than ever.

